COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE PRICEANDERSON ACT: RIPENESS AND STANDING
BEFORE THE HOLOCAUST
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Price-Anderson Act,1 which regulates the liability of power
companies for personal injuries and property damage in the event of
a nuclear power plant catastrophe, has been subject to constant scrutiny from both policy and constitutional viewpoints 2 since Congress
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
AEC, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U.S.
MERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rasmussen Report];

COM-

J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as J. MOORE];
10 C. WRIGHT-& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1973) [hereinafter
cited as C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER];
13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1975)
[hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER]:
Amendments to the Price-Anderson Provision of the Atomic Energy Act, 121 CONG.
REC. 11,926 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1975) [hereinafter cited as House Debate];
Phaseout of Governmental Indemnity, 121 CONG. REC. 22,328 (daily ed. Dec. 16,
1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Debate];
Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. AEC, Civil No. 19-72 (D.D.C. April
16, 1975) (three-judge court) [hereinafter cited as ConservationSociety];
Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, No. C-C-73-139 (W.D.N.C., filed
June 22, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Carolina].
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 6 (1975). PriceAnderson amended section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011
et seq. (1970).
2. For a review of policy criticisms, see notes 7 & 8 infra. Soon after the Act
became law, its $560 million liability ceiling, see notes 4 & 5 infra and accompanying
text, was criticized as irrationally low in comparison to the then-estimated measure of
damages. Huard, Reactors and Radioisotopes: The Need to Revise National Policy, 11
STAN. L. REv. 7, 24 (1958); see Murphy, The Problem of Liability for Atomic Incidents
and Insurance Against Them, in 1 LAw AND ADMINISTRATION, Series X, 58, 84 n.77
(H. Marks ed. 1959). It was argued subsequently that the Act's liability cut-off encroached upon state powers in violation of the tenth amendment by restricting causes
of action in tort and that its denial of full recovery to persons suffering nuclear injury
caused by intentional or reckless conduct contravened the due process and just compensation clauses of the fifth amendment. Collier, Are the "No Recourse" Provisions of the
Price-Anderson Act Valid or Unconstitutional?,4 HOUSTON L. REV. 236 (1966). Collier
contended, as part of his due process analysis, that the $560 million figure was irrationally low. Id. at 237-38. He also pointed out that Price-Anderson's regulation of causes
of action in tort differs from other liability limitation schemes, such as automobile guest
statutes, in that it forbids full recovery even for damages caused by gross negligence.
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initially enacted the legislation in 1957.3 The controversy has focused
upon section 2210(e), 4 the critical provision in the Act which presently
limits the aggregate liability for damages arising from any single nuclear
incident to $560 million.5 Because the Act-recently extended for
Id. at 256-68. '"The intolerable extension of the legal immunity of the parties who ought
to be primarily responsible so as to include therein cases of unlawful intentional acts
and cases of reckless and wanton misconduct is like a cancerous infection. It will
destroy the legality of the entire 'statutory section in which it is imbedded." Id. at 265.
Collier's arguments were criticized in Law Article Review, 8 AToMIc ENERGY L.J. 367
(1966). These claims have been renewed in the instant lawsuits. See note 12 infra.
In 1965 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy reviewed the problem of the constitutionality of section 2210(e) and concurred with the United States Attorney General and
the General Counsel of the AEC that there was no constitutional problem. However, it
is not clear whether, or to what extent, the Joint Committee considered any fifth and
tenth amendment problems. See S. REP. No. 650, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., in 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADM. N. 3209, 3214-15; cf. S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., in
1957 U.S. COonE CONG. & ADM. N. 1803, 1816.
Congress was apparently aware of the constitutional arguments against Price-Anderson but regarded them lightly until the recent debates on the bill to extend the Act.
Murphy, supra, at 84 n.77. The Conservation Society and Carolina cases were frequently adverted to in those debates, however. See, e.g., House Debate 11,942, 11,949,
11,951; Senate Debate 22,360, 22,366. The constitutional claims were also discussed.
See generally House Debate 11,933, 11,939, 11,942; Senate Debate 22,337, 22,353,
22,360, 22,373.
3. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 6 (1975).
Section 2210(e) provides in part:
The aggregate liability for a single nuclear incident of persons indemnified,
including the reasonable costs of investigating and settling claims and defending
suits for damage, shall not exceed (1) the sum of $500,000,000 together with
the amount of financial protection required of the licensee or contractor or
(2) if the amount of financial protection required of the licensee exceeds
$60,000,000, such aggregate liability shall not exceed the sum of $560,000,000
or the amount of financial protection required of the licensee, whichever amount
is greater: Provided, That in the event of a nuclear incident involving damages in excess of that amount of aggregate liability, the Congress will thoroughly review the particular incident and will take whatever action is deemed
necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of a
disaster of such magnitude ....
This is a very expansive provision in two important respects. First, the term "nuclear
incident" comprehends any nuclear occurrence, including occurrences resulting from
storage of nuclear wastes, "within the United States causing within or outside the United
States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or
loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive,
or other hazardous properties of . . . nuclear . . . material . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2014
(q) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 1 (1975). Second, the exclusion of tort
liability exceeding $560 million includes exclusion of liability resulting from gross negligence, recklessness and intentional behavior, as well as from simple negligence.
5. The 1975 amendments to the Price-Anderson Act effected several changes in
section 2210(e), two of which deserve notice although they are significant for present
purposes only insofar as they reflect Congress' continued concern with protecting the
public in the event of a nuclear disaster. First, the amended statute provides for a
gradual rise in the liability ceiling up to "the amount of financial protection required of
the licensee." Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 6, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1975). This
provision adapted section 2210(e) to section 3 of the amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-197,
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a third ten-year term 6 -has enjoyed spectacular success in achieving
its goal of stimulating private investment in the nuclear industry, 7 it has
§ 3, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b), which created a "retrospective rating plan" designed
to raise gradually the amount of private insurance available to nuclear power plants,
to end the federal government's indemnitor status, and to raise the liability ceiling to
one billion dollars by 1990. H.R. REP. No. 648, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1975).
This provision will not go into effect until 1977, nor will it make any "immediate change"
in the $560 million ceiling. Id. at 11. Second, amended section 2210(e) requests Congress to take any "necessary and appropriate" action in the event of a disaster exceeding
the liability limitation. This change, apparently designed to make Congress a back-door
insurer once the front door closes, merely writes into the statute a promise which had
been frequently repeated in prior committee reports, see, e.g., S. REP. No. 296, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess., in, 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. N. 1803, 1810, and which would
not, of course, be binding on any future Congress. House Debate 11,942, 11,950. This
provision, while intended to further public protection, was attacked by opponents of the
Act's renewal as a transparent admission that the liability limitation was too low. House
Debate 11,942 (remarks of Rep. Seiberling). It was also criticized as a "peculiarly
inappropriate way to resolve the problems inherent in the liability limitation," in that it
would be likely to make recovery more difficult for injured persons. S. REP. No. 454,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975) (separate views of Sen. Tunney).
6. The Price-Anderson Act has consistently been described as "temporary legislation" even though its liability limitation is to remain in effect for forty years for all
licenses granted prior to its expiration. S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1975)
(separate views of Sen. Tunney); Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity,
71 MiCH. L. REv. 479, 491-92 (1973). Nevertheless, the recent amendments added a
third ten-year term to the Act. Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 5(a) (1975), amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(d) (1970); see Pub. L No. 89-210, § 2, 79 Stat. 855 (1965) (adding the first
ten-year extension).
7. Congress intended that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq.
(1970), should speed the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The PriceAnderson Act was designed to further this intent. S. REP. No. 650, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. N. 3209, 3211-12. The dual purposes of the original
Price-Anderson legislation were to protect the public by assuring that funds would be
available for paying claims arising from a nuclear disaster and to stimulate private investment in nuclear power plants by removing the deterrent posed by the threat of enormous potential liability. Id. at 3212. Although it has been forcefully argued that pro.
tection of industry rather than protection of the public was the primary consideration
behind the Act, see Green, supra note 6, at 499-502; Note, The "ExtraordinaryNuclear
Occurrence" Threshold and Uncompensated Injury Under the Price-Anderson Act, 6
RuTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 360, 379 (1974), Congress has frequently restated its commitment to public protection. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., in 1957
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. N. 1803, 1816, 1817, 1826; S. REP. No. 650, 89th Cong., 1st

Sess., in 1965 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AM. N. 3209, 3214; Senate Debate 22,332 (the

public protection and industry protection purposes are in fact inseparable). The major
amendments that have been made to the Act demonstrate continuing concern with facilitating recovery for claims arising out of nuclear power plant incidents. For example, in
1966 Congress added 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1970), authorizing the AEC to require
power companies to agree to waive any tort defenses in the event of an "extraordinary
nuclear occurrence" (and thus impose a scheme of strict tort liability). It also added
42 U.S.C. § 2210(o), providing for the creation of claim disposition and fund distribution plans to facilitate recovery for damages in the event of a catastrophe. Pub. L
No. 89-645, § 3, 80 Stat. 891 (1966). A similar purpose is manifest in the recent
amendments, see note 5 supra.
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been a serious impediment for those environmentalists who fear the

possible consequences of a proliferation of nuclear power plants before
their safety is more firmly established. 8 But because the American
nuclear industry has never experienced any of the "extraordinary nuclear
occurrences" which would trigger section 2210(e), 9 Price-Anderson

has never been reviewed in the courts.
8. The argument that the nuclear industry has developed only because of PriceAnderson, see Green, supra note 6, at 509-10; Nader, Nuclear Power on Trial, 10 TRIAL
19, 21 (1974), possibly overstates the case. High potential liability has not prevented
the profit motive from stimulating private investment in other ultrahazardous activities,
such as rocket component manufacture, pipeline and airplane manufacture and operation,
dam construction, and chemical and explosives manufacture. See H.R. REP. No. 648,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1975) (separate views of Rep. Roncalio); House Debate
11,933, 11,939; Senate Debate 22,367-69. Nor has unlimited liability stopped private
nuclear power plant investment in Japan. See Maeda, Nuclear Legislation in Japan, in
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, EXPERIENCE AND TRENDS IN NUCLEAR LAW

145 (1972). Removing the liability ceiling would possibly have no different effect in
the United States. See S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1975) (separate
views of Sen. Tunney); House Debate 11,933. But see H.R. REP. No. 648, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7-8 (1975) (without Price-Anderson, the financial consequences of a nuclear
disaster would be "chaotic"; moreover, removing the liability limitation would drive
smaller manufacturers, engineers and suppliers out of business, deter entry into the
nuclear market, and result in less disaster compensation due to reduced ability to pay).
But there can be no question that the Act has achieved its purpose of stimulating
investment. Generation of electricity from nuclear fission is today a multi-billion
dollar industry. House Debate 11,933 ($80 billion industry); Senate Debate 22,346
($50 billion industry). It supplies eight percent of the nation's electric power, see
id. at 22,345, and much larger percentages of the power used in certain regions, see,
e.g., id. at 22,332 (twenty-four percent in New England); id. at 22,344 (thirty-three
percent in Illinois). There are currently some 238 nuclear facilities beyond the planning
stage, including 56 that are licensed to operate and 63 that are under construction. See
Id. at 22,330. Nearly 1,000 more reactors may be needed by the turn of the centurya goal which demands that work on several hundred begin in the next few years. See
Primack, Nuclear Reactor Safety: An Introduction to the Issues, 31 BULL. OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 15, 18 (Sept. 1975).

The continual pressure which industry representatives have exerted upon Congress
for creation and extension of the protection offered by section 2210(e) attests to its
importance to potential investors. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 648, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
2, (1975); House Debate 11,927; Green, supra note 6, at 490-91. Harold Green, in
a leading article on Price-Anderson, contends that it was in large part the fear of
astronomical damages to persons and property which might arise from nuclear incidents
(see Appendix) that forced the enactment of the Price-Anderson Act. Green, supra note
6, at 482-87. Green further asserts that the fundamental policy error in the PriceAnderson Act is that the indemnity and liability limitation clauses of section 2110(e)
operate to externalize the costs of accidents by placing them on the general public and,
when the liability ceiling is exceeded, on the victims of the catastrophe. This vitiates
the benefit offered by liability insurance, which acts as a self-regulatory device to discourage ultrahazardous activity. Id. at 502-06; see Senate Debate 22,337, 22,345. Green
concludes that the very existence of the Act shows that Congress exercised poor judgment in deciding the degree of risk that society should be compelled to accept in the
name of technological progress. Green, supra note 6, at 504-05.
9. An "extraordinary nuclear occurrenve" is an event causing a dispersal of nuclear
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In the past two years, however, two suits, Conservation Society
of Southern Vermont v. AEC'0 and Carolina Environmental Study

Group v. AEC," have challenged the constitutionality of section
2210(e).12 In each case, the Government has moved to dismiss the
action for lack of justiciability, contending that plaintiffs lack standing
to sue and that no constitutional issue is ripe for adjudication. The court

in Conservation Society agreed with the government and dismissed the
suit.' 3 In Carolina, however, the court refused to "decide such grave
issues upon allegation only" and ordered a four-day testimonial hear-

ing "on the facts relating to standing, ripeness and justiciability, including the rationality of the dollar amount" of Price-Anderson's lia14
bility ceiling.
The issues are of enormous significance, as a decision against the
Government on the merits could alter the direction of this nation's
energy policy. This Comment will review the questions presented in Conservation Society and Carolina, critically evaluate the responses of

the two courts, and conclude that a court may properly decide such
cases on their merits. Such a result would avoid the anomaly which
material in amounts which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (formerly the Atomic
Energy Commission), in its sole discretion, determines (1) to be "substantial" and (2)
"has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages" to persons or property
off-site. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1970). Such a determination would have the effect of
holding the indemnified power company or contractor strictly liable in tort for any damages "caused" by the dispersal, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1970). This strict liability
would, however, be cut off at the $560 million level. In the event of an incident with
damages exceeding or likely to exceed the statutory ceiling imposed by section 2210(e),
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be required to assist the court in which all
actions arising out of the incident would be consolidated, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2), in
designing a plan for fairly allocating the funds available under the Act among persons
injured and likely to be injured by the incident. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(o) (1970), as
amended, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 13 (1975).
10. ConservationSociety.
11. Carolina.
12. Although the court's opinion is not clear on this point, it appears that plaintiffs' sole constitutional claim in Conservation Society was that the liability limitation
of section 2210(e) violated the fifth amendment by taking property without just
compensation. Conservation Society at 3-4. For further discussion of this case see
notes 97-111 infra and accompanying text. Plaintiffs' claims in Carolina are more expansive: they contend that the limitation on liability deprives them of due process and
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fifth amendment and of the access' to
the courts and to common law remedies guaranteed by the ninth and tenth amendments.
The basis of the equal protection argument is that Price-Anderson irrationally discriminates between victims of nuclear disasters and victims of all other torts. Brief for
Plaintiff at 17-26, Carolina (submitted July 16, 1975). For further discussion of this
case see notes 112-74 infra and accompanying text.
13. Conservation Society at 4-5.
14. Order of Jan. 6, 1976, Carolina. The hearing took place Sept. 27-30, 1976.
The court's decision is pending at the time of this writing.
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arises when a law designed to foster conditions which may provoke a
catastrophe is deemed subject to challenge only after the catastrophe
has occurred.
II.

A.

JUSTICIABILITY

Standing

Standing to sue, as it has developed in the federal judicial system' 5 in the twentieth century,' is among those legal concepts about
which generalization is the most difficult."7 Its boundaries are indistinct
and its formulation has shifted considerably under changing Supreme
Court standards during the past decade.' 8 Perhaps the most useful
general principle that can be stated about the standing requirement is
that it must be applied to specific factual contexts on a case-by-case
15. Standing in the state judicial systems is a simple concept which seldom stirs
litigation. The complex rules of standing discussed herein are purely creations of the
federal courts. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450,
468-69 (1970); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv.
L. REV. 1265, 1309-12 (1961).
16. It has been recognized since the early days of the republic that judicial review
is limited to controversies between opposing parties, and that the judiciary wields no
general veto power over legislation. Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368
(1803); see Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 18 N.Y.L.
FoRUM 911, 912 (1972). Nonetheless, the requirement of standing as a discrete
component of the "case or controversy" clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, did not
derive from the common law or the constitutional conventions, but rather entered
American law in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See Berger, Standing
to Sue, in Public Actions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 817-19
(1969).
17. "Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970); see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968). The vagueness of the terminology
used in general standing rules is well illustrated by Chief Justice Hughes' classic statement of the "case or controversy" requirement (as applied to declaratory judgment actions) in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937):
A "controversy" in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial
determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference
or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or
moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon
a hypothetical state of facts. Where there is such a concrete case admitting
of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties
in an adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the judicial function may be
appropriately exercised although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants
may not require the award of process or the payment of damages. And as it
is not essential to the exercise of the judicial power that an injunction be sought,
allegations that irreparable injury is threatened are not required. [Citations
omitted.j
18. See notes 27-52 infra and accompanying text.
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basis. 9 It is, however, reasonably clear that there are two essential aspects to standing. First, the constitutional aspect requires that the plain-

tiff allege sufficient actual or imminent injury in fact resulting from the
challenged activity so as to ensure that there is a "case or controversy"

within the meaning of article HI.20 This aspect of standing is a purely
procedural limitation upon a court's jurisdiction and must be determined
solely on the face of the pleadings.'

Second, the discretionary aspect

demands that there be a sufficient connection between plaintiff's injury
and the protectible interests he seeks to assert to warrant the exercise

of the court's jurisdiction. 2 This prong of the standing requirement
often requires some advance consideration of the merits. 23 Because
both dimensions of the standing doctrine are rooted in considerations of
separation of powers24 and judicial economy,25 the plaintiff must
19. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific
Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER § 2757, at 755.
20. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . and Controversies . ..

."

U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3531,
at 176.
21. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 224-25 n.15
(1974); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970). "Of course, pleadings must be something more than an ingenious academic
exercise in the conceivable," and "the allegations must be true and capable of proof at
trial," United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 688-89 (1973), but standing may be found where concrete injury capable of proof
is alleged, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972). All
material allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true and construed in favor
of the plaintiff for purposes of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969), and the
trial court may request or allow further allegations to support plaintiff's standing by
way of affidavits or an amended complaint, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
22. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
23. This is equally true under the "legal interest" test, see note 32 infra and
accompanying text, and under the "zone of interests" test, see note 33 infra, even though
the Court has tried to differentiate the two on the ground that the latter would not require
examination of the merits, Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see Dugan, Standing to Sue: A Commentary on
Injury in Fact, 22 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 256, 266, 269 (1971). The same will almost
certainly be true under the new test asserted in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),

since it essentially announces a return to the "legal interest" standard. See notes 44-45
infra and accompanying text. Commentators have charged that the discretionary aspect
of standing necessarily produces premature and inadequate consideration of the case on
the merits. See, e.g., Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14
STAN. L REv. 433, 439, 441 (1962); Note, Mootness and Ripeness: The Postman
Always Rings Twice, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 867, 877-79 (1965). Some have concluded
that injury in fact ought to be the only requirement for standing. See, e.g., Davis, supra
note 15, at 468, 472; see note 33 infra.
24. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3531, at 224-28.

Recent

standing cases have spoken forcefully of the need to limit the role of courts in making
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satisfy both standing tests in all federal actions, even where a declaratory
judgment is the only relief sought.28
1. Constitutional standing. It is widely agreed that the categories of injury which could satisfy the constitutional case or controversy requirements were considerably expanded in a series of Supreme
Court decisions during the late years of the Warren Court and the early
years of the Burger Court.

Those cases repudiated the notion that

an economic injury must be more than nominal28 and established that
policy in a democratic society, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975), and of the
need to restrict constitutional adjudication to instances where it is "necessary" so as to
avoid opening "the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing 'government by injunction,'" Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22
(1974); see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Commentators, however,
have pointed out that overemphasis of the separation of powers doctrine may obscure
the no less important constitutional concept of checks and balances. See, e.g., Berger,
supra note 16, at 828-29. Justice Douglas, shortly before his retirement, suggested that
the present Court is using the standing doctrine as a disguise for the "political question"
doctrine in order to prevent access to the federal courts. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Compare the majority opinion in Warth, id.
at 500.
25. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)
('The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply
because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries");
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring, setting forth
seven settled rules of judicial self-restraint). For criticism of the fear of a flood of
litigation as a policy basis for denying standing, see Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3531, at 225; Scott,
Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REV. 645, 673-74
(1973).
26. See, e.g., Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). Commentators, however,
have propounded widely varying interpretations of the effect of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). Compare C. WRIGHT & A. MrLER § 2763, at 818
(Supreme Court has shown marked reluctance to decide important issues of public law
by declaratory judgments), with Dickson, Declaratory Remedies and Constitutional
Change, 24 VAND. L. REv. 257, 258 (1971) (the Act has expanded the whole notion
of a justiciable controversy).
27. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976);
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973). The decisions most often referred to in this connection are United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971);
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). For
discussion of this broadening trend, see Davis, supra note 15; Jaffe, Standing Again, 84
HA.v. L. REv. 683 (1971); Scott, supra note 25; Sedler, Standing, Justiciability and All
That: A BehavioralAnalysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1972); Tucker, supra note 16.
28. See 6A J. MOORE 57.11, at 57-100. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), had indicated that a threat to a taxpayer's economic interest in how his tax
money would be spent was not sufficient to show injury in fact. Later cases established
that injuries as small as a $5 fine plus costs, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
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harm to such abstract non-economic interests as aesthetic, recreational
and spiritual values could meet the constitutional requirement.2 9 It
was held sufficient that the plaintiff claim to be personally and adversely
affected by the challenged action, and that his alleged injury be "perceptible" and "capable of proof at trial"; 0 mere interest in a question,
however longstanding it might be and however competent the litigant to
assert it, could not provide a basis for standing.3
and a $1.50 poll tax, Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
were sufficient to support standing to challenge the constitutionality of state statutory
and constitutional provisions. Professor Davis, while insisting that there must be some
injury, interpreted these cases to mean "that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to
fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motivation." Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cus. L. Rav. 601,
613 (1968) (the Supreme Court specifically approved his formulation in United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 n.14 (1973)).
Finally, in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court held in the special context
of a first amendment challenge to a state spending program that a taxpayer's loss under
a spending measure did establish a sufficient personal stake to support standing.
29. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970) (dicta). The Court held that potential economic injuries which constituted
present harm to plaintiffs' competitive interests passed constitutional muster. Id. at
154-55. Thus plaintiffs, who sold data processing services to other businesses, had
standing to challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that national banks
could provide data processing services to other banks and to bank customers. The Court
reaffirmed the broad dicta of Data Processingin Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
738 (1972), saying that injury to plaintiffs' enjoyment of and interest in preserving
national parkland would be sufficient to lay the basis for standing to challenge an administrative ruling that would affect the status of that parkland. Id. at 734. The Court
made its furthest extension of this injury in fact doctrine in United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), holding that plaintiffs'
alleged interest in using the natural resources of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area was enough to support standing to challenge an Interstate Commerce Commission
order which would allegedly injure that interest by encouraging the use of nonrecyclable
goods and the nonuse of recyclable goods. Interestingly, all three cases arose under
section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), purporting to
grant standing to anyone "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute." None presented any constitutional claims.
Although there was a suggestion that the types of injury capable of satisfying
article III were different in cases arising out of statutory grants of standing (such as the
APA) than in cases where standing was not claimed under any statutory authority, the
commentators and the lower courts failed to make any such distinction. See note 31
infra.
30. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 688-89 (1973). But cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
209-10 (1972) (how plaintiffs might go about proving alleged injury was irrelevant).
31. [Blroadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of
standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party
seeking review must himself have suffered an injury . . . . [A] mere "interest
in a problem," no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how
qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by
itself to render the organization "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within
the meaning of the APA [Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1970)]. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-39 (1972) (dismissing the
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Sierra Club's complaint for failure to allege that it or any of its members
had been actually harmed by the challenged action).
Despite this caveat, some persons interpreted the Court's expansion of the types of
judicially cognizable injury to mean that virtually any allegation of "injury" would
suffice. Dugan, supra note 23, at 260-61, 267, 272-75; Sedler, supra note 27, at 511-12,
see Davis, supra note 15, at 468-71. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208 (1974), abruptly quelled that belief. Plaintiffs alleged that Armed Forces
Reserve membership by Congressmen violated the incompatibility clause of the Constitution: "[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member
of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. Chief
Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, stated that a justiciable injury must be "concrete";
plaintiffs' claim that the asserted constitutional infringement could injure their interests
in the faithful discharge of congressional duties and in having the Constitution enforced
as written, alleged only an "abstract" injury and therefore must be dismissed. Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217, 221-23 (1974).
Although the Chief Justice's language on this point was imprecise, he apparently
meant that the complaint was constitutionally infirm for failing to allege any actual
deprivations of plaintiffs' asserted rights:
The very language of respondents' complaint . . . reveals that it is nothing
more than a matter of speculation whether the claimed nonobservance of that
clause deprives citizens of the faithful discharge of the legislative duties of
Reservist Members of Congress. And that claimed nonobservance, standing
alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance, and that is an abstract injury. Id. at 217 (footnote
omitted).
This language seems to mean that plaintiffs failed to allege "concrete injury" because
they failed to allege any specific action by any individual reservist member that damaged
their purported interests. See also id. at 223-24. In this sense Schlesinger represents
not a withdrawal from prior case law but only a refusal to expand the definition of constitutional standing so as to include imperceptible injuries. This discussion, however,
is confusingly interspersed with references to "speculative" injury, which goes to problems
of ripeness, see notes 54, 56 & 65 infra, and "generalized" injury, which goes to the discrctionary aspect of standing, see notes 32, 33, 37 & 41 infra and accompanying text.
The Court's stated reasons for holding to this "concrete injury" standard seem less
than fully persuasive. The first reason given is that motivation alone cannot produce
the focusing effect of concrete injury necessary in constitutional adjudication. Second,
the vigor and competence of plaintiff's presentation, which a motivation standard must
rely on, can only be evaluated after consideration of the merits. Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226 (1974). In the first of these
respects the Court has broken with the conclusions of most legal writers and some lower
courts that plaintiff's asserted interest, coupled with his investment in the litigation,
assures that the issues will be properly focused. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for Hudson
Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Office
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.); Sedler, supra note 27, at 512; Tucker, supra note 16, at 938.
In the second respect, the Court ignored the obvious truism that the vigor and competency
of the representation will be apparent from the quality of the pleadings and of the briefs
and arguments on the justiciability questions themselves. The Court's suggestion that a
"logical corollary to this approach would be . . . that the inadequacy of the presentation on the merits would be an appropriate basis for denying standing," Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226 (1974), is unexplained and inexplicable.
The Court was aware of, but not troubled by, the prospect that its refusal to
broaden the categories of constitutional standing might mean that some constitutional
infractions would go unredressed. Id. at 227. It thought this possibility a lesser evil
than providing "government by injunction." Id. at 222. This reasoning clearly reflects
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2. Discretionarystanding. The Court has been equally active
during its past several terms in tightening the application of discretionary, or "prudential," subconstitutional standing concepts. The main
line of early standing cases establishing discretionary requirements had
held that a plaintiff .would have no standing to sue, even though there
was an actual controversy within the meaning of article III, unless
he could show that the challenged governmental conduct had directly

injured one of his particularized legal interests; assertion of an interest
on behalf of the public at large was insufficient. 82 The late 1960s and
the change in the Court's attitude on justiciability, since but a few months earlier it had
expressed a fear that a narrow approach to standing "would mean that the most injurious and wide-spread Government actions could be questioned by nobody." United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688
(1973).
The Court has recently commented that the broadening of the categories of judicially
cognizable injury had taken place in the limited context of judicial review of regulatory
action, suggesting indirectly the possibility of future contraction of those categories in
constitutional adjudication. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization,
426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976). Such contraction remains, to date, purely conjectural. The
Supreme Court has not previously differentiated the standards for reviewability in
statutory cases from those applied in cases in which a purely constitutional right is asserted, and most of those who have considered the issue have seen no reason to distinguish between the various sources of rights for article I purposes. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 167-68,
178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Davis, supra note 28, at 603-04; Hasl, Standing
Revisited-The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 12, 26 nn.82-83
(1973).
32. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149-60 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); 6A J. MooRE 57.11, at 57-98 to 57-107. The requirement of "directness" imports, in one of its aspects, that the alleged unlawful action be
causally connected to an injury to the rights of the plaintiff or to the rights of someone
whose relationship to the plaintiff justifies consideration of those rights. E.g., Poe v.
Ulman, 367 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1961). An established exception to this causation rule
arises where a statute indirectly exerts a "chilling effect" on first amendment rights.
See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1972). The Court has also intimated that
where the injury is sufficiently concrete, it may apply a balancing test and find standing
even though plaintiff alleges an "attenuated line of causation." United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973). In its most
recent standing decision, however, the Court held the causation test to be part of the
article III standing requirement and indicated that an "attenuated line of causation"
will not. suffice. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26
(1976); see notes 46-52 infra and accompanying text.
In its other aspect, "directness" means that the challenged action must be "final."
The concept of sufficient finality of governmental action to warrant judicial intervention
overlaps with the constitutional requirement of actual or imminent injury and with
considerations of ripeness. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3531, at 183-84;
cf. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424 (1969) (it was irrelevant that investigatory
body had taken no action to impose direct sanctions on plaintiff where its mere investigation would have substantial impact upon him); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (injury to plaintiff private school maintenance corporation was sufficiently direct and statutory action requiring that all children attend public schools was
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early 1970s witnessed a relaxation of discretionary standing rules in
the form of a steady whittling away at the particularity and legal interest tests and their replacement with a requirement that the plaintiff's interest lie within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by
the statute in question. 3 This trend toward easy access to the federal
sufficiently final even though statute would not take effect for several years). Recent
cases have not altered this aspect of the discretionary standing requirement. See Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738
(1972).
A "legal" interest is one which would be cognizable at common law if asserted
against action undertaken by an individual, or one created by the Constitution or by
statute. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118,
137 (1939). The common law test has been referred to only infrequently in recent
cases, but its continued vitality is evident both in case law and in the literature. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424 (1969); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
493 n.22 (1959); Scott, supra note 25, at 650.
The "particularity" standard, strongly rooted in separation of powers doctrine, holds
that a litigant may not challenge governmental action unless it affects him in some way
not suffered by the public at large. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). "It is an established principle
that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity
of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public." Ex parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam).
33. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), indicated that a taxpayer could in some
circumstances challenge a congressional measure even though its impact upon him was
the same as that felt by all other taxpayers. Plaintiffs in Flast sought declaratory and injunctive relief against administration of an act of Congress appropriating funds to pay
for textbooks and instruction in parochial schools. The taxpayers requested that the
statute be struck down or its enforcement enjoined because it violated the establishment
and free exercise clauses of the first amendment. A three-judge district court had dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, relying upon the "prevailing view
of the commentators" that Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), which had held
that a federal taxpayer has no standing as such to challenge the constitutionality of a
federal statute, established only a nonconstitutional rule of self-restraint. 392 U.S. at 92
n.6. Noting that plaintiff in Frothingham "was denied standing not because she was a
taxpayer but because her tax bill was not large enough," id. at 93, the Court found that
there was no rigid bar to suits by federal taxpayers challenging the constitutionality of
federal taxing and spending programs. A "taxpayer may or may not have the requisite
personal stake in the outcome, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case."
Id. at 101. Other decisions have expansively interpreted Flast's non-particularity rule
in cases dealing with a variety of interests. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973) (interest in recreational
use of Washington, D.C., area); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)
(aesthetic and environmental interest in national parkland). See also id. at 738 n.13
and cases cited therein.
Flast also ignored the "legal interest" requirement, supplanting it with the famous
"nexus" test. 392 U.S. at 101-02. In the Court's words:
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the
taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of
legislative enactment attacked. .. . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a
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nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. . . . When both nexuses are established, the litigant will
have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will
be a proper and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction. Id.
at 102-03.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, accurately predicted that the nexus test could not long
survive. Id. at 117. Within a year the Court rephrased the test, indicating that Flast
essentially required a connection between the challenged action and a legally protected
interest. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1969).
The Court further modified the nexus test shortly thereafter in Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), holding that one
has standing to challenge governmental action if his allegedly injured interests are
"arguably within the zone of interests sought to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 153; cf. Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (stating that it was sufficient if the plaintiff himself was within
the zone of the statute's protection). In developing this new test, the Court explicitly
rejected the "legal interest" test as going to the merits. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
The specific language the Court used in announcing the "zone of interests" test is
significant in two respects. First, it apparently encompasses interests damaged by both
administrative and congressional action. Although Data Processing arose under the
Administrative Procedure Act (plaintiff claimed injury to a competitive interest caused
by a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency), nothing in the Court's discussion
indicated that the "zone of interests" test was limited to APA questions or even to
challenges to administrative action generally. In fact, the lower federal courts have
freely applied the zone of interests test in challenges to nonadministrative as well as
administrative governmental action. Has], supra note 31, at 25-26, 39; Sedler, supra
note 27, at 489.
It is true that in subsequent decisions the Court has invoked the Flast test rather
than the Data Processing test in determining whether plaintiffs had standing. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 123, 124 (1973); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18
(1973). In Roe, the Court granted standing to challenge state abortion laws to a
pregnant single woman but denied it to a childless married couple who wanted to
remain childless; Linda R.S. held that the mother of an illegitimate child lacked standing
to challenge the refusal of a local official to prosecute the father under a state child
support law. Both cases, however, involved administrative as well as statutory action
and each case cited Data Processing during its standing discussion. It has been
suggested that in fact the two tests are so similar that they can be used interchangeably,
the chief distinction being that the nexus test allows greater flexibility in deciding whether
judicial review is appropriate. Hasl, supra note 31, at 21-22; see Scott, supra note 25,
at 660, 667-68.
Second, the language used in setting forth the zone of interests tests may facilitate
overcoming the constitutional standing requirement by suggesting that cognizable interests
can be created not only expressly but also by implication. Under Data Processing, the
interest the plaintiff seeks to protect need only be "arguably" within the zone of interests
protected by the applicable statute or constitutional guarantee. 397 U.S. at 153. The
Court stressed that "[w]here statutes are concerned the trend is toward enlargement of
the class of people who may protest administrative action." Id. at 154. It went on to
say that a protectible interest could be found in the implications of statutory language
and in its legislative history as well as in explicit terminology, id. at 154-55, so long as
there was no statutory language precluding judicial review. Id. at 156-57. The Court
applied these same criteria to find standing in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164-65
(1970), adding that "preclusion of judicial review of administrative action adjudicating
private rights is not lightly to be inferred." Id. at 166. See also Investment Co. Institute
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1971); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6-7
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courts came to a sudden stop with Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee

to Stop the War 4 and its companion case, United States v. Richardson.35
These cases, apparently limiting the prior decisions to their facts,

6

reintroduced the requirement that plaintiff's injury be differentiated
from that of the general public, at least in cases where the interest
asserted is of nonstatutory origin,3 7 and intimated that the "zone of
(1968). For a discussion of the application of these criteria by lower federal courts see
Has], supra note 31, at 33-39.
The vigor of the liberalizing trend represented by Data Processing may be seen in
the fact that during the several years following the decision there were virtually no
reported federal court dismissals for lack of standing to challenge governmental action
once injury in fact had been shown. Sedler, supra note 27, at 486, 511; see C. WRIGHT,
A. MiLLER & E. CooPER § 3531, at 196 (the zone of interests test will be satisfied
whenever there is no special reason to deny review). Two Supreme Court Justices and
most commentators maintained that injury in fact was the only meaningful inquiry in
standing cases and that the prudential aspect of standing should be dispensed with altogether. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970) (Brennan and White, JJ.,
concurring and dissenting); Davis, supra note 15, at 471-73; Sedler, supra note 27, at
486-87, 511-12. But see C. WRI-Grr, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3531, at 203; Jaffe,
supra note 27, at 636-37.
34. 418 U.S. 208 (1974). For discussion of the facts in Schlesinger see note 31
supra.
35. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson, the Court, per Chief Justice Burger,
denied standing to a plaintiff seeking to obtain a declaratory judgment holding unconstitutional a provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b)
(1970), permitting the Agency to account for its expenditures merely on the certificate
of its Director. In addition, plaintiff sought an order compelling the Secretary of the
Treasury to disclose Central Intelligence Agency appropriations to the public. Plaintiff based his claim to standing as a taxpayer under Flast's dual "nexus" test, see note
33 supra, contending on the one hand that there was a logical nexus between his taxpayer status and the challenged spending provision, and on the other hand that there
was a nexus between his status and a specific constitutional limitation imposed on Congress' taxing and spending power: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account
of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 418 U.S. at 167-70. Plaintiff also claimed standing
as a citizen, id. at 169 n.3, apparently on the theory that nondisclosure of CIA finances
interfered with the fulfillment of his duties as a voter, id. at 176.
36. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225, n.15,
228 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1974). Each case
distinguished Flast on the narrow ground that Flast involved a challenge to the taxing
and spending power. See note 31 supra.
37. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21,
226-27 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974). Both cases
relied heavily upon a rarely cited forty-year-old per curiam decision, Ex parte Levitt,
302 U.S. 633. (1937), for the proposition that injuries to general public interests are
insufficient to support standing. However, there are good reasons to suppose that the
bar against exercising general grievances would not extend to injuries based upon statutorily protected rights. See Note, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of
the Public Citizen, 24 AM. U. L. Rnv. 835, 869-70 (1975). That Note points out that
Schlesinger could bear a more narrow interpretation. Throughout its discussion, the
Court in that case ambiguously referred to both lack of a sufficient personal stake and
lack of a differentiated injury as reasons for its failure to find a "concrete injury" suffi-
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interests" test would henceforth be limited to instances of statutorybased review.3 8 Finally, the Court paved the way for possible subse-

quent restriction of the rules of standing by stressing that the mere
fact that no one would have standing to challenge putatively unlawful
action if the plaintiff did not is no reason to find standing.3 9
The Court went further in Warth v. Seldin,4 0 reaffirming Schlesingers particularized injury requirement 4 ' and reviving the seemingly

interred "legal interest" test. In Warth, the Court affirmed an order
dismissing an attack on a zoning ordinance as racially discriminatory
on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had alleged demonstrable
particularized injury caused by the ordinance. Justice Powell, speaking for a majority of five, 42 stated that although Congress may expressly
cient to support standing. See 418 U.S. at 217, 218, 220, 221, 227 n.16 (1974). Thus,
one might conclude that a sufficiently specific injury, even though generalized in its
impact, would afford a basis for standing. Note, supra, at 869-70. Richardson, however, seems to have resolved the ambiguity: whatever the injury, it must be "particular"
to the plaintiff or there is no standing, United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-78
(1974); Note, supra, at 871.
Both Schlesinger and Richardson could be read to apply only to taxpayer standing
suits. This reading would reflect the fact that both cases were taxpayer suits based on
infrequently litigated constitutional clauses and would ascribe the results to the Court's
fear of a flood of litigation in the taxpayer area. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974). Such a limitation of the cases would permit challenges to congressional action which are based upon generalized injuries but
which are predicated upon something other than the litigant's taxpayer status. To so
interpret the cases would, however, appear to run afoul of the Court's broad compunctions against confrontation with coordinate branches, id. at 222, and against indulging
in unnecessary constitutional adjudication, id. at 221, 226-27.
38. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 n.16
(1974).
39. See id. at 227; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
40. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
41. "Mhe Court has held that when the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance'
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone
does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction." Id. at 499. Thus, Warth answers any
lingering doubts about the particularization requirement of Schlesinger and Richardson,
see note 37 supra, and adds a new dimension: one may not sue in federal court to
assuage any grievance-taxpayer, citizen or otherwise-held in common with all or
even a large class of other citizens in the absence of explicit or implicit authorization
from Congress or the Constitution.
42. Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and Marshall,
protested that the quality and quantity of factual allegations demanded by the Court to
satisfy the direct injury test imposed an impossible burden on the plaintiffs which was
reminiscent of "outmoded" pleading notions and which could only be explained by an
indefensible hostility to their claim on the merits. Justice Brennan also demonstrated
the incompatibility of the majority's notions of causation and injury in fact with prior
case law.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas argued that plaintiffs had standing
to sue under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, apparently within the terms of the new test
asserted by the Court.
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or by "clear implication!' grant a right of action to one who would
otherwise be barred by prudential standing rules,48 plaintiff "generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests."" Moreover, the Court
apparently discarded the "zone of interests" concept: without even
mentioning it, Justice Powell said that the essential question of the discretionary aspect of standing is now "whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood
as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief."45
3. A unified view. It is apparent from the foregoing discussion
that the constitutional and discretionary aspects of the standing requirement, while historically accorded independent analytical status,
are logically intertwined. The Court's most recent standing decision
suggests that the traditional analytical distinction may have been complicated by the importation of discretionary considerations into the article
III determinations.

In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

43. Here, the applicable prudential standing bar was jus tertii, which "normally bars
litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others in order to obtain relief
from injury to themselves." 422 U.S. at 509. Congress could have removed the bar
by statute, but here "no statute expressly or by clear implication grants a right of
action, and thus standing to seek relief, to persons in petitioners' position." Id. at 510;
see id. at 500-01. The phrase "clear implication" is crucial to an understanding of the
Court's retreat from its prior expansionary trend in discretionary standing: whereas
indications of mere congressional awareness of the interests asserted by plaintiff might
have sufficed a few years ago to provide standing, see Scott, supra note 25, at 663, the
Court will now find statutory standing only where Congress clearly implies its intent
to grant a right of action. How strong an implication must be to qualify as "clear" is,
in light of Warth's recent vintage, a matter of speculation. It would appear unmistakable
that the Court will demand closer scrutiny of legislative history and statutory language
before it will imply a right of action than was formerly the case. See note 33 supra.
44. 422 U.S. at 499. The Court referred to statutory and constitutional bases of
"legal rights," id. at 500, 509. Although it failed to refer to injuries that would have
been cognizable at common law as a basis for discretionary standing, one would not
expect the Court's silence to mean that it rejected them since common law injuries have
only infrequently been referred to in this connection. See note 32 supra.
45. 422 U.S. at 500 (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted). The critical difference is that whereas previously plaintiff's interest had only to be "arguably within the
zone of interests" regulated by the applicable statutory or constitutional provision, see
note 33 supra, he must now be "properly understood" to have a right of action under it.
The Court's citation of several post-Data Processing administrative challenge cases in
support of the new rule, including Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), and
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669
(1973), suggests that the "properly understood" test will supplant Data Processing in
administrative challenges as well as in other statutory and constitution-based attacks on
governmental action. The Court did not overrule Data Processing but it is difficult
to imagine what vitality that case retains.
The Court in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26
(1976), did not reach the prudential standing question, as the case was decided on article
HI grounds. See notes 46-52 infra and accompanying text. Thus, the validity of Data
Processingwas not discussed. See 426 U.S. at 41 n.19.
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48 the Court shifted its "constitutional" focus away from
Organization,

the categories of injury that might satisfy the case or controversy requirement and emphasized instead two factors not previously prominent
in the case law.
In Eastern Kentucky, several indigents and organizations repre-

senting low-income persons sought to challenge an IRS revenue ruling
which enabled non-profit hospitals to retain their tax-exempt status

while denying most hospital services to the poor.47

Justice Powell,

writing for the majority,48 found that although the alleged denial of

access comprised constitutional injury, article I further required that
the factual allegations of the complaint establish that the revenue ruling had caused such injury or would do so in the future.49 Moreover,
46. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
47. The action was brought against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as a class action on behalf of all persons unable to afford
hospital services. Plaintiffs claimed that Revenue Ruling 69-545, which broke from prior
IRS policy in permitting favorable tax treatment to nonprofit hospitals that offered only
emergency room services to indigents, encouraged hospitals to deny access to the poor.
Plaintiffs requested various injunctive remedies and a judgment declaring that the Revenue Ruling was void because it conflicted with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1970), and because it was issued in violation of the rulemaking
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966). The district
court rejected several arguments against reaching the merits, including the defense that
plaintiffs lacked standing. It then declared the ruling invalid under the Code. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 338 (D.D.C. 1973). The
court of appeals agreed with the district court's resolution of defendants' jurisdictional
arguments but reversed on the merits. 506 F.2d 1278, 1283, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
48. The Court split six to two, with Justice Stevens not participating. Justice Stewart
wrote a brief concurring opinion, stating that only in first amendment cases might one
whose federal tax liability was not affected have standing to litigate that of someone
else. 426 U.S. at 46. For discussion of the dissenting opinion of Justices Brennan
and Marshall, see notes 51-52 infra and accompanying text.
49. 426 U.S. at 40-42. The Court assumed, for purposes of analysis, that plaintiffs had been injured by past denial of hospital services. Id. at 41. But it stressed
that the plaintiffs had failed to name any hospital as a defendant, and that:
Art. III still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that
fairiy can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury
that results from the independent action of some third party not before the
court. Id. at 41-42.
In the absence of factual allegations pertaining to the actual behavior of hospitals, the
Court suggested,
[it is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to petitioners' "encouragement" or instead result
from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.
Id. at 42-43.
The Court's conclusion that "it does not follow from the allegation [as to "encouragement"] . . . that the denial of access to hospital services results from petitioners' new
Ruling," seems apt since the injuries upon which plaintiffs based their claim to standing
occurred before the promulgation of the new ruling which would supposedly bring about
such injuries. See id. at 45 n.25.
Eastern Kentucky's causation analysis raises the question how comprehensive
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the Court held, again as a matter of article III jurisprudence, that there
was an insufficient showing that the plaintiffs would "profit in some
personal interest" from a favorable decision on the merits to permit the
exercise of judicial power. 50 Justice Brennan, concurring in the dismissal of the action but taking issue with the standing analysis, 51 argued
that the Court's decision added historically non-constitutional standing considerations to the article III requirements.52 Regardless of the
allegations of fact need be to show that one event "results from" another. The trial
court, relying upon published writings on the purposes of revenue rulings, considered it
no "wild speculation" to "recogniz[e] that the relaxation of the requirements for charitable classification would necessarily effect [sic] hospital policy, in this case care for
indigents, upon which such a [tax-exempt] status had been earlier dependent." Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 330 (D.D.C. 1973) (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan, who would have sustained the district court on this
point, thought that the majority opinion imposed an unprecedented and impossible burden
on persons seeking to challenge administrative action. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 64 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). But the Supreme Court's decision, read fairly, says no more than that a
party who fails to indicate in his complaint how a challenged action will harm him
differently from the way he was being harmed in the absence of such action has failed
to show how any injury will "result from" that action.
50. Id. at 39 (emphasis added). "The necessity that the plaintiff who seeks
to invoke judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Art. III
requirement." Id.; see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05, 508 (1975); Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 n.7 (1974). The Court's
emphasis on profit as the measure of concreteness was new. Previous cases taught that
where a court could definitively determine the legal rights of parties who sought "specific
relief" of a "conclusive character," "the judicial function may be appropriately exercised
although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not require the award of
process or the payment of damages." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241
(1937).
51. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, found the majority's reasoning on
standing to be an "unjustifiable" "obfuscation" which was "clearly contrary to the relevant precedents" and which was "particularly unnecessary when there are obvious and
reasonable alternative grounds upon which to decide this case." 426 U.S. at 46. The
dissenters would have dismissed some of the claims as not ripe and others by summary
judgment on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to introduce evidence showing a causal
connection between Revenue Ruling 69-545 and the alleged reduced provision of indigent
services at tax-exempt hospitals. Id. at 47-54.
52. Of course the most disturbing aspect of today's opinion is the Court's insistence on resting its decision regarding standing squarely on the irreducible
Art. III minimum of injury in fact, thereby effectively placing its holding beyond congressional power to rectify. Id. at 64 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
The dissenters felt that the Court's demand for a causative link was much stricter than
that required in prior prudential standing cases, id. at 58-60, and that its insistence
on a past injury contradicted prior cases permitting a plaintiff to complain of future
harm. Id. at 57, 61. Justice Brennan feared that the effect of adding these prudential considerations to the injury in fact question would result in undercutting the entire
line of cases decided under the Administrative Procedure Act and transforming the case
or controversy requirement into "'a catchall for an unarticulated discretion on the part
of this Court' to insist that the federal courts 'decline to adjudicate' claims that it prefers
they not hear." Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
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view taken of the desirability of the result, it is difficult to dispute
Justice Brennan's premise that the constitutional/discretionary distinction has been blurred, perhaps beyond future recognition, and that therefore many justiciability determinations formerly left to the discretion
of the lower courts may have been subsumed within the expanded
constitutional imperative.
B.

Ripeness

Ripeness doctrine comprises an uncertain mixture of prudential
and constitutional restraints on a court's willingness to consider other-

wise justiciable controversies.53

It poses, above all else, a question of

timing: has the litigant raised the issue at the moment which is most

propitious for its resolution?54

Like other subconstitutional com-

53. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, § 3532, at 240-41. Compare Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976) (ripeness is not a jurisdictional question), with Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 3, 128 (1973) (contingent injury could not present a case or controversy).
54. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976); Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 143-45 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 38-40 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 23, at 876.
Ripeness is based in part on prudential considerations which are common to other
elements of justiciability. The question most frequently arises in the context of constitutional challenges to statutes or other governmental action, in which the major concern
is with the separation of powers doctrine. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying
text. The limitations "derive from the fundamental federal and tripartite character of
our National Government and from the role-restricted by its very responsibility--of
the federal courts, and particularly this Court, within that structure." And "[t]hese
considerations press with special urgency in cases challenging legislative action or state
judicial action as repugnant to the Constitution." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503
(1961). Thus the courts have spoken of their duty to avoid ruling on the political
expediency or wisdom of challenged legislation, United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 89 (1947), to refuse to reach constitutional questions unnecessarily, Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 71-72 (1961), and to refrain from
acting as councils of revision, National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1969). These considerations are common to other elements of justiciability
as well as to ripeness. See notes 16, 24 supra.
Ripeness cases also focus on judicial efficiency. Ripeness doctrine strives to prevent
courts from useless entanglement in abstract or hypothetical questions, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), on the theory that judicial resources are
most wisely utilized if confined to cases with closely defined facts in which exercise of
the judicial power is necessary. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 72, 78-79 (1961). Although the fear of a flood of litigation is often
advanced as a reason for refusing to hear "abstract" questions in the standing context,
see, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974);
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3531, at 225, the Court has shown little concern
with that fear in ripeness cases. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 154-55 (1967).
The ripeness question must, of course, be answered with regard to specific factual
contexts on a case-by-case basis. Cf Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 96-97 (1968);
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ponents of justiciability theory, such as mootness, abstention, and the
political question doctrine, ripeness analysis requires balancing the
parties' actual need for present adjudication against the likelihood that
future contingencies may render immediate judicial review inadvisable." Ripeness decisions emphasize the need both for actual or immediately threatened harm"6 and for a direct causal connection between

that harm and the challenged action. 57 The doctrine stands, therefore, in intimate and inseparable relation to both the constitutional
and the discretionary aspects of the standing requirement.5 The utility
of ripeness analysis lies in its development of specific reasons for not
adjudicating when a litigant has otherwise sustained his article IH burden.5" This doctrine has generally received zealous application by
the Supreme Court in all forms of litigation, 60 incliding declaratory judgment actions. 61 Contrary to the trend in the standing cases, however,
the Court has not manifested a growing reluctance to adjudicate claims
of questionable justiciability in the ripeness area; indeed, the opposite

appears true.
The requirement that there be a current factual context to frame
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3532, at 238-39. Ripeness cases echo the points
stressed by standing cases: there must be sufficient factual allegations to assure
that the controversy is real and immediate, see, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969), that the issues are capable of judicial resolution, see, e.g., last v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 97 (1968), and that constitutional decision-making will be no broader than specific factual contexts require, see, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
89-90 (1947). "Judicial exposition upon political proposals is permissible only where
necessary to decide definite issues between litigants . . . . Should the courts seek to
expand their powers so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over
constitutional issues, they would become the organ of political theories." Id. at 90-91.
55. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); L. JAFFE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 410-11 (1965); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3532,
at 238.
56. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 12-13, 15 (1972); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498, 508 (1972);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947).
57. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13, 15 (1972); Socialist Labor Party
v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 587-88 (1972); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923).
58. These concerns are not categorical requirements but are to be considered as
interdependent factors. L. JAFFE, supra note 55, at 395-96; see Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 504-05 n.9 (1961).
59. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3532, at 239.
60. See 6A J. MoORE 57.18[2], at 57-176.
61. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 506 (1961); cf. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER § 2763. But see 6A J. MOORE
57.18[2], at 57-183 (the requirement for "immediate injury" may be lower in declaratory judgment actions than in injunction actions).
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constitutional adjudication stems not merely from an unwillingness to
invade the sanctum of co-equal branches of government 2 but also
from a fear that prospective determination of governmental action may
fail to consider relevant matters that particular facts might disclose"'
or affected parties whose situation might present new grounds for
decision. 64 More generally, courts will refuse to entertain a suit by

a litigant who has shown injury in fact if his primary complaint concerns anticipated conduct the impact of which upon him is too uncertain or contingent.65
62. See note 54 supra.
63. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1965); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 10, 78 (1961).
64. See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 549-50 (1948).
65. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3532, at 239:
Contingency may be important in part because it diminishes the present impact
of challenged acts or rules on the litigant, who may be complaining primarily of
anticipated impact, even though there remains sufficient impact to give standing
under present rules. More vitally, contingency may be important because of
its impact on the suitability of the issues for determination. The issues to be
decided may require detailed factual illumination; issues decided presently may
prove to be irrelevant to the conflict that actually develops; the issues may be
sensitive questions better avoided on principles of avoiding constitutional determination, or of reluctance to interfere with coordinate branches or trespass on
state concerns; there may be dangers of intruding into ongoing administrative
programs before the agency has crystallized its own views.
Thus, courts have refused to rule on statutes whose construction is unclear, see,
e.g., Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1945); California v. Oroville-Wyandotte Irrigation Dist., 409 F.2d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 1969), or
whose effect on the complainant is impossible to discern, see, e.g., Socialist Labor
Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588-89 (1972); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 78 (1961). In such instances it is ordinarily necessary to await
the threatened injury so as to frame the issues with concrete facts. Similarly, courts
have hesitated to permit statutory review when it is some future act of the plaintiff that
will cause the law to be invoked. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1965);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. CooPER § 3532, at 247. A court will not review governmental action which fails to
present even a remote likelihood of harm to the plaintiff, see, e.g., Golden 'v. Zwickler,
394 U.S. 103 (1969); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 507-08 (1961); C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER § 2757, at 759, and a court may seek to avoid constitutional adjudication when
present hardship is not significant. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583
(1972); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3532, at 246. Finally, the availability
of convenient alternate remedies in the event of future harm militates against the propriety of immediate review of the challenged action. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 126 (1973); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1967).
"But the number of contingencies that can be found in a particular situation seems
largely a verbal matter, and the practical likelihood that the contingencies will occur
and that the controversy is a real one should be decisive in determining whether an
actual controversy exists." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER § 2757, at 760; cf. Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273-74 (1941). The issues may be ripe
for review even though the law has not been enforced or will not cause any injury to
plaintiff for some time. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Thus,
review is appropriate where statutory provisions are mandatory in their operation against
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These principles may be seen in operation in the Supreme Court's
two most recent ripeness decisions. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases 0 considered constitutional challenges to the Regional

Rail Reorganization Act of 1973,67 a complex statutory scheme for
handling the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings of eight major
railroads.0 8 Plaintiffs, the major creditors and sole stockholder of the
Penn Central Transportation Co., contended that the Act violated their

fifth amendment rights by taking their property without just compensation in two respects. First, it failed to provide an adequate quid pro
quo for the Penn Central properties whose transfer was compelled (the
"conveyance taking" issue).69 Second, it compelled the railroad to
the plaintiff, see, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498, 508 (1972);
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 150-53 (1967), where the law is certain
to be enforced as he claims, see, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163
(1967); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), where a statute is unquestionably invalid on its face, see, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961); City of
Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 84 (1958), or where the questions
presented are purely legal in character and need little factual elaboration, see, e.g., Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 171 (1967); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER § 3532, at 244. Prevention of future injury is a good reason to find ripeness,
see, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498 (1972), especially where the
parties have already taken steps that will inevitably result in litigation. See C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER § 2757, at 761-63; cf. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312
U.S. 270 (1941).
In particular, any indications of significant present hardship to the complainant
weigh heavily in favor of entertaining the suit. Thus, a statute which applies coercion
or other sanctions to obtain compliance with the statutory scheme is particularly ripe
for review. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151-52 (1967).
So is a law which disturbs the "primary conduct" of the plaintiff, see, e.g., Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967), or one which creates important uncertainties which affect
his behavior, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, reaffd, 263 U.S. 350
(1923); see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER § 3532, at 260-61. To extend this line
of reasoning, fundamentality of the substantive rights asserted may affect the reviewability
of the issues. See id. at 245-46.
66. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
67. 45 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973), amending 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
68. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 108-17 (1974). The
Act created a Government corporation, the United States Railway Association (USRA),
to design a plan to restructure the railroads into a financially self-sustaining system.
In order to achieve this goal, the USRA was directed to transfer some of the railroads'
property to Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), a private, state-incorporated corporation, in exchange for Conrail securities plus up to $500 million in federally guaranteed
USRA obligations and other benefits. The final plan was to be submitted to Congress
and would become effective unless rejected by either House. The Act also created a
Special Court with exclusive jurisdiction to order effectuation of the plan and to determine its fairness and equity, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The railroads
were forbidden to discontinue service or abandon any of their lines without USRA
authorization and local transportation authority acquiescence.
69. Plaintiffs claimed that the aggregate value of the Conrail securities, USRA ob-
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continue operating even if its estate eroded beyond constitutional limits
during the reorganization period (the "erosion taking" issue). 7°

A

three-judge federal district court, holding that the conveyance taking
issue was raised prematurely but that the erosion taking issue was ripe,
declared the Act unconstitutional in part and enjoined its enforcement. 71
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, reversed, finding that both issues were ripe for adjudication and holding that the
Act was constitutional.72
The Court's analysis on the justiciability of the erosion taking issue
turned on the same two points that had been decisive on the district
court level.7" First, Penn Central's books told a story of steady deficit operations for years before and two months after the Act was passed,
supporting an inference that erosion of its assets might accelerate to
plaintiffs' detriment during the time of compelled operations. Second,
the Court relied upon a finding below7 4 that Penn Central could not
be reorganized on an income basis within a reasonable time. The
Court concluded that refusing to decide whether the Act precluded
an adequate remedy for such loss "would raise the distinct possibility
that those plaintiffs would suffer an 'erosion taking' without adequate
assurance that compensation will ever be provided. 7 5 The Court
ligations, and other benefits was irrationally low in comparison with the value of the
railroad properties. Id. at 118.
70. Id.
71. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp. v. United States Ry. Ass'n, 383 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.
Pa. 1974). The district court based its conclusion that the Act was unconstitutional on
a finding that the legislative history precluded plaintiffs from remedying any erosion
taking harm by suing the United States in the Court of Claims pursuant to the Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970). 383 F. Supp. at 525-30. In addition, the district court
held that some of the provisions of the Rail Act violated the constitutional requirement
that bankruptcy laws be uniform, U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 383 F. Supp. at 533-35.
72. The Supreme Court held on the merits that the Rail Act did not violate the fifth
amendment because the remedy provided by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970),
would be available to any plaintiff not adequately compensated by the terms of the
reorganization plan. Further, the Court saw no violation of the uniformity requirement
of the bankruptcy clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.4, because there were no other
railroad reorganization proceedings pending at the effective date or during the effective
period of the Rail Act.
Justice Douglas, joined in dissent by Justice Stewart, agreed with the Court's
ripeness analysis but contended that the Rail Act unconstitutionally precluded a Tucker
Act suit. Justice Douglas further argued that the Act violated the fifth amendment even
with the Tucker Act available and that it offended the bankruptcy clause.
73. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp. v. United States Ry. Ass'n, 383 F. Supp. 510, 52325 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
74. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 382 F. Supp. 831, 842 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on
other grounds, 384 F. Supp. 895 (Special Ct. 1974).
75. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124 (1974) (emphasis
added, citation omitted). The United States had argued that the Court should reach
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held that the issue was therefore ripe for decision, even though plaintiffs had not as yet suffered an unconstitutional taking.
This holding, despite the Court's sketchy explanation, demonstrates the balancing process that ripeness analysis entails: weighing the needs of the parties for present adjudication against the impact
of contingencies that could render adjudication unnecessary. Certainly
In addition, since plaintiffs
such contingencies were present here."
could readily have litigated the issue at such time as they suffered unreasonable loss, there was no absolute need to litigate immediately.
The Court was evidently persuaded to reach the merits by countervailing pragmatic factors: the question appeared to be purely legal
and needed little factual development; the statutory provisions were
mandatory in their application against plaintiffs as investors in Penn
Central; the contingencies which might obviate future litigation appeared unlikely and the possibility of future loss quite likely; the substantive rights involved were property interests, among the most basic
of constitutional rights; and uncertainty concerning future remuneration was likely to affect plaintiffs in their daily business activities.77 But
the most significant aspect of this balancing process was the standard
employed: constitutional review of the Rail Act did not require past,
present, or certain future harm, but only a "distinct possibility" that
injury might occur.
The Court provided a more detailed analysis and followed a similar
line of reasoning in balancing contingencies against the needs of the
parties in the course of its discussion of the ripeness of the conveyance
taking issue. The Court initially explained why the contingencies in
the administration of the Act which influenced the district court's
holding of prematurity s posed no real obstacle to present adjudicathe merits even though there was an "extremely unlikely" "theoretical possibility" that
plaintiffs would be injured by a taking of property though interim erosion. Id. at 123.
76. For example, the railroad might cease to be unprofitable, a successful reorganization plan might be designed more rapidly than anticipated, or plaintiffs might decide
not to litigate at the time they realized their loss.
77. See note 65 supra.
78. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp. v. United States Ry. Ass'n, 383 F. Supp. 510, 518
(E.D. Pa. 1974). The district court found that three events would have to occur before
the plaintiffs could sustain an actual injury. First, the reorganization court had to decide
whether to order conveyance of the rail properties to Conrail. (At the time, the reorganization court had conducted a hearing on this question but had made no findings.)
Second, USRA had to draft and deliver to the Congress a final plan, and both Houses
had to approve it. See note 68 supra. Third, the Special Court had to direct the conveyance within ten days after Conrail deposited its securities. "Faced with this triple
contingency, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have been exposed to harm. Until these
contingencies occur, only an abstract issue appears. . . ." Id.
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tion. First, the intervening judicial construction of the Act had mooted
one of those considerations.79 Second, the Court found that the terms
of the Act would lead "inexorably" to a conveyance of Penn Central's property, but it arrived at this conclusion by means of a contingency analysis so unconvincing as to indicate that the standard
actually being employed was the "distinct possibility" test set forth
in the erosion taking discussion.8 ° Third, it indicated that the possibility
that full judicial relief would be available to the plaintiffs after the

conveyance occurred should not discourage present review. 8 '

Con-

cluding, the Court stated that since the operation of the statute against

the specific plaintiffs was "in no way hypothetical or speculative," it
79. Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138-40 (1974). The appropriate time for making ripeness determinations is the time of hearing in the forum court,
not the time of filing or decision in the lower court. Id. at 140; see Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976). In the Rail Cases, the district court expressed concern that the
reorganization court might refuse to order conveyance on the ground that the Act was
unfair or inequitable to the railroad estate. This would prevent design of the reorganization plan. See note 68 supra. But by the time of the Supreme Court's deliberation, the
Special Court had already reversed a reorganization court holding to that effect and
determined that the restructuring process was fair and equitable. In re Penn Central
Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895 (Special Ct.), rev'g 382 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
80. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974). "Mhe
implementation of the Rail Act will now lead inexorably to the final conveyance, although the exact date of that conveyance cannot be presently determined." Id. The
Court admitted the truth of one consideration that had influenced the district courtthat either House of Congress could disapprove any final restructuring plan. See note
68 supra. It also noted that the Act set forth no timetable for presentation of successive
plans. Nevertheless, it assumed that a final plan would "at some time" be certified for
approval to the Special Court, although no one could say quite when. 419 U.S. at 140.
The vagueness of this time schedule far exceeded that in prior cases which had held that
the presence of a time delay between the lawsuit and the future injury was irrelevant for
ripeness purposes. See notes 65 supra and 82 infra. It strains the limits of language
to hold that a conveyance so contingent in time and circumstance will "inexorably" and
"inevitably," 419 U.S. at 143, take place. Neither the stipulation by the parties that a
conveyance pursuant to the Act was ultimately "likely," id. at 140, 141 n.26, nor the
Court's finding (contrary to a finding of the district court, see note 71 supra) that the
Special Court lacked authority to refuse to order a transfer after Congress approved the
plan, id. at 141, explains the Court's conclusion. The Court would have been more faithful to the facts and more helpful to the lower courts and to future litigants had it spoken
in terms of strong practical likelihood or "distinct possibility" rather than in terms of
inevitability. Compare its analysis of the erosion taking issue, discussed at notes 73-77
supra and accompanying text.
81. 419 U.S. at 141-43. "mhe possibility that a court may later decline to enforce
the Rail Act as written because of its unconstitutionality cannot constitute a contingency
itself pretermitting earlier consideration of the constitutionality of the Act." Id. at 142.
This reasoning extended the familiar principle of ripeness doctrine that the availability of
convenient remedies in the future militates against present adjudication, see note 65
supra. In this instance, there would not be any convenient alternative remedies: due to
the complexity of the plan it could be reasonably expected that the conveyance "in practical effect will be irreversible once it is made." 419 U.S. at 145.
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was irrelevant to justiciability analysis that the injury would occur in
the future. 2
The rest of the conveyance taking analysis dealt with considerations militating in favor of present review."' This discussion primarily
echoed familiar concerns of ripeness cases-minimizing impact on the
primary conduct of the parties, preventing irreparable injury from
taking place, and choosing the most practical time to evaluate governmental action. 84 But the strength of the Court's emphasis on timing
was new, 85 as was its statement that the statutory foreclosure of options
otherwise available to the plaintiff argued in favor of immediate review."" These two factors, taken in conjunction with the "distinct
possibility of future injury" standard set forth in the Rail Cases,817 suggest that ripeness theory may be entering an expansionary era.
The Supreme Court's brief discussion of ripeness in a second
recent decision, Buckley v. Valea,88 appears to confirm the beginning
of an expansionary trend. Buckley was a declaratory judgment action
brought by various federal officeholders, candidates, organizations and
others who challenged the constitutionality of key provisions of the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.11 They
urged that the very existence of the Federal Election Commission, a

legislative agency with both quasi-judicial and quasi-executive powers,
violated the Constitution because the membership selection procedure
82. Id. at 143. The uncertainty of the schedule of occurrence of critical events in
the Rail Cases, see note 80 supra, far exceeded that in the prior cases upon which the
Court relied. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), involved a mandatory scheme for allocation of natural gas supplies that was to be implemented immediately. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), considered a statute that was
to take effect upon a specific date. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
upheld a tax law that was to go into effect against petitioners the very year of the
lawsuit.
83. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143-45 (1974). The
Court implied that in the absence of such considerations it would ordinarily dismiss a
suit with as skimpy a factual record as was present in this case. Id. at 143-44.
84. Id. at 144-45. See notes 54, 65 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 54 supra and cases cited therein. The pronouncement that it was "particularly significant" that "there is no better time to decide the constitutionality" of the
Act, 419 U.S. at 144, is much stronger than prior statements made in this connection.
Nonetheless, the Court did not apply this concept blindly. It refused to determine the
controversy over proper valuation of the rail properties and Conrail stock until there was
a more complete factual record. Id. at 146-48.
86. Id. Here the Court added another to the list of reasons, see note 65 supra, why
ripeness may be found despite the presence of contingency.
87. See notes 75, 80 supra and accompanying text.
88. 424 U.S. 1,113-18 (1976).
89. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (1974).
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created by the Act9 ° offended the separation of powers principle.
The court of appeals, relying on the "concrete facts" rationale, had
held that this issue had been raised prematurely because the Commission had not exercised its powers. 9 1 The Supreme Court unanimously

reversed this determination, in part on the ground that the mere passage of time between the appellate court's decision and its own was

in itself significant. Although the FEC had still not exercised most
of its powers, its efforts to do so in the intervening months proved
that "the date of their all but certain exercise is now closer by several
months." 92
The Court explained that the Commission had begun to issue
rules and regulations. It also mentioned the desire of Congress that
issues relating to the constitutionality of the Act be litigated as rapidly

as possible. 93 Other considerations common in ripeness decisions but
not discussed in Buckley also weighed in favor of review.94 But not90. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
91. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 891-93 (D.C. Cir.), rev'g 387 F. Supp. 135
(D.D.C. 1975).
92. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 116-17 (1976). Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision. Five Justices filed separate opinions dissenting from certain portions
of the majority per curim opinion. None, however, disagreed with the resolution of the
ripeness issue or with the conclusion on the merits that the appointment provision offended the separation of powers doctrine. For a discussion of the separation of powers
question raised in the case, see Note, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The
ProbableResponse to a ConstitutionalChallenge, 1976 DU=n L.J. 285.
93. 424 U.S. at 115-17; see 2 U.S.C. § 437h (Supp. m, 1972), as amended, Pub.
L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
94. It can scarcely be doubted that the Court considered more reasons than it discussed in finding this issue ripe. For example, the immense public interest in knowing
the lawful power of the FEC could not, in an election year, have been far from the
Justices' minds. The Commission was to administer the Act's limitations on political
contributions, campaign spending by candidates and convention spending by political
parties, its requirement for disclosure of expenditure information and its system of public
funding of qualified candidates and political parties. The activities of the Commission
were thus of prime importance to voters, candidates and political parties alike. The Supreme Court adverted to the congressional intent, expressed in the Act, that the constitutionality of provisions of the Act be litigated as soon as possible. 424 U.S. at 117. Although such intent presumably could not confer ripeness on an issue that was premature
for judicial review, see Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1975), it
certainly demonstrated the strong public interest in immediate determination of the
constitutional range of the FEC's powers and may have removed any qualms the Court
might otherwise have had about interfering with the processes of a coordinate branch of
government. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
Nor could the Justices have been blind to the fundamentality of the substantive
rights that might be affected by FEC decisions. Freedoms of speech and association
were at the heart of the controversy. Compare note 65 supra.
Moreover, the issues were arguably pure questions of law with little need for factual
elaboration. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (controversy over whether FEC's delegated executive and judicial powers were sufficiently re-
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withstanding these justifications, the Court strained existing principles
in finding this issue ripe for adjudication. It provided no convincing
answer to the court of appeals' point that no one had ever been, nor
was there any non-hypothetical reason to suppose that anyone ever
would be, injured by the FEC's exercise of its powers. 5 The Court's
determination that the Commission's efforts over a several month period
to exercise some of its powers meant that it was all but certain that all
of them would at some time be exercised demonstrates an even narrower
view of the restraining power of contingency than the Court took in the
Rail Cases.06 The Buckley decision reinforces the conclusion that the
crucial inquiry in ripeness calculation is now not whether a "certainty"
but rather whether a "distinct possibility" of future injury exists.
C.

Justiciability: Summary

The Supreme Court is actively engaged in reworking the principles
of justiciability in the standing and ripeness areas. The overall trend
has been to restrict the regions within which a litigant may find standing to sue but to reduce somewhat his burden of proving the maturity
of his injury once he has attained standing. To satisfy the constitutional
standing requirement, he must, as in the past, allege a perceptible
concrete but not necessarily economic injury. He must, in addition,
specify in his pleadings the manner in which the challenged action has
caused that injury and the sense in which the requested remedy would
redress his injury. Prudential standing rules have narrowed considerably, embracing in ordinary cases the venerable standard of direct injury to a particularized "legal" interest. But Congress may, expressly
or by clear implication, confer a right of action upon a person who
would otherwise be barred by prudential restraints. Ripeness requirements, while still phrased in terms of actual or certain impending injury, have been relaxed somewhat: the likelihood of contingencies which
would render review unnecessary, viewed with a more pragmatic and
perhaps narrower focus than heretofore, is to be balanced against the
practical needs of the parties in order to determine whether it is best
to decide the issues now rather than in the future. It is in this context
that the current lawsuits seeking to strike down section 2210(e) of
the Price-Anderson Act must be examined.
lated to its appropriate legislative powers would be better resolved in context of actual
facts after those powers were implemented).
95. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
96. See notes 66-87 supra and accompanying text.
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CAN THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRICE-ANDERSON BE
DETERMINED BEFORE A CATASTROPHE OCCURS?

Justiciabilityin Conservation Society

Plaintiffs in Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. AEC1
were environmental groups opposing the proliferation of nuclear reactors in the United States generally."' They sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against various provisions of the Atomic Energy Act
of 195411 which they claimed were unconstitutional. The thrust of their
attack was that the Act violated their due process rights by combining
both regulatory and promotional functions in the Atomic Energy Commission. 10 0 A three-judge federal district court held that this issue
had been mooted by intervening legislation.' 0 ' As a subsidiary claim,
however, plaintiffs also attacked Price-Anderson's liability ceiling 0 2
on due process grounds, contending that it injured their interest in
preventing mass construction of nuclear power plants.)03
But the
court found that their attack on section 2210(e) was in fact rooted
not in any such nonproliferation interest but rather in the property
04
interests of possible future nuclear accident victims.
The court assumed arguendo that plaintiffs would have standing
to assert the rights of such victims. Nonetheless, since no one had
been injured in a disastrous nuclear incident, and since "the likelihood
97. Conservation Society (Bazelon, J.).
98. Id. at 1.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1970).
100. Conservation Society at 1. Plaintiffs claimed that they were deprived of a fair
and impartial hearing in individual licensing proceedings both because of the dual functions vested in the AEC by the Act and because the agency's promotional activities biased
its performance of its regulatory responsibilities. Plaintiffs demanded that the AEC be
split into separate licensing and developmental agencies and that further licensing be
prohibited until that division was accomplished.
101. Id. at 2-3. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801 et seq.
(Supp. 1976) divided the AEC into two new agencies along the lines plaintiffs had requested. See note 100 supra. The Energy Research and Development Administration
assumed the AEC's research and development responsibilities and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission now administers licensing functions.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 94-197 (1975). See
notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
103. Conservation Society at 3-4. Apparently the complaint was vague in its attack
on Price-Anderson. No request for relief based on Price-Anderson's invalidity was made,
and Judge Bazelon had to puzzle out the connection between the Act and plaintiffs' alleged injury. "Although plaintiffs have not so stated, their position must be that [section
2210(e)] contributes to this proliferation by reducing the cost-of-doing-business for
nuclear power companies. Without the limitation on liability, potential investors might
prefer conventional plants whose potential for large-scale damage is not so great." Id.
at 3.
104. Id. at 3-4. See notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text.
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of an accident of that magnitude is quite small," the court found that

the Act had insufficient real or immediate impact on the rights asserted
and accordingly dismissed the suit for lack of ripeness."0 5
On the basis of the facts as alleged, the court's analysis cannot

be seriously faulted.' 06 Although a cogent argument can be made that
a serious incident is considerably more likely to occur than the government has claimed (see Appendix for further discussion), there is no
indication that any evidence to that effect was presented to the court.
As a result, even though the issue presented was predominantly legal
in nature, 10 7 the lack of palpable immediate injury to the plaintiffs,
combined with the apparently highly contingent nature of the anticipated
harm, weighed heavily against the propriety of interfering with the
will of Congress. 0 8

Although the court went beyond the terms of the complaint in
construing the Price-Anderson attack as based on the property interests
of prospective victims rather than plaintiffs' asserted interest in halting
nuclear power plant proliferation, the chosen analysis provided the
only means of avoiding a dismissal for lack of standing. While injury
to the interest claimed by plaintiffs would probably be sufficiently
concrete to satisfy the minimal requirements of article 111,109 the in105. Conservation Society at 4-5.
106. The one criticism that might be made of Judge Bazelon's justiciability analysis is
that he employed the wrong standard for discretionary standing. The zone of interests
test promulgated by Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. 'v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970), controlled the prudential aspect until Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975), effectively reinstituted the legal interest requirement. See notes 40-45 supra
and accompanying text. Judge Bazelon's opinion, which was handed down a few weeks
prior to Warth, nevertheless relied upon the seemingly buried legal interest test. Conservation Society at 5. This has no effect on the outcome of the case, however, since
the Conservation Society holding was based on ripeness, not standing. After Warth,
courts have fared no better than Judge Bazelon in selecting the proper test in this extremely confused area of federal law. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs' opposition to municipal building
plan limiting population increase was not within zone of interests protected by constitutional right to travel).
107. The question of the rationality of Price-Anderson's $560 million liability ceiling
is basically a pure legal issue. The only factual setting which could help to focus this
question would be a situation in which the ceiling had actually been exceeded, confirming all current predictions. See Appendix.
108. Conservation Society at 4-5.
109. The constitutional standing requirement may be satisfied by a minimal injury to
such non-economic abstract interests as spiritual, aesthetic, recreational and conservation
values. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text. The interest in nonproliferation
of hazardous nuclear power plants asserted in Conservation Society is sufficiently similar
to recognized conservation and, perhaps, aesthetic values that an injury to this interest
would arguably be cognizable under article m. Nevertheless, there is room for doubt
as to whether the Supreme Court will be ready to recognize new forms of abstract injury
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terest itself would appear to have no recognized legal status. No
statute or common law principle creates a general interest in halting the
development of nuclear power plants, nor has any reported decision
found implied rights of this nature in property owners, much less nonproperty owners, under the fifth amendent. The plaintiffs, therefore,
could not have withstood the prudential standing requirement that they
demonstrate a sufficient connection between the interest asserted and

the protective intent of the statutory, common law or constitutional
guarantee in question. 110 Moreover, plaintiffs did not succeed in differentiating their interest in nonproliferation from that which might
be held by persons generally and therefore failed to meet the particularized interest test imposed in cases of nonstatutory-based standing."'
B.

Justiciabilityin Carolina

The contentions of the complainants in Carolina Environmental
Study Group v. NRC,1 2 in which the justiciability issues are currently
pending, 1 3 are broader in scope and based on factual allegations dif-

ferent from those raised in Conservation Society. Plaintiffs are a local
conservation society whose members live in the vicinity of the McGuire

and Catawba nuclear stations near Charlotte, North Carolina, a labor
union with a membership living and working in the same locality, and
several individuals residing in that area. 1 4 They were unsuccessful
in light of the attitude of retrenchment exhibited in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See notes 34-39, 46-52 supra and accompanying text. It
is doubtful, moreover, whether plaintiffs in Conservation Society could have withstood
strict article III scrutiny in any event since they alleged organizational injury rather than
concrete injury to their individual members. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
738-39 (1972). See also note 31 supra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 33, 38, 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
111. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22, 226-27 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974). See notes 37, 41 supra and accompanying text.
112. Carolina.
113. Judge McMillan held a four-day testimonial hearing on the justiciability issues
Sept. 27-30, 1976, after finding them in an earlier hearing to be too serious to decide on
the basis of allegation only. Order of Jan. 6, 1976, Carolina (entered Jan. 6, 1976).
See also text accompanying note 14 suprd. His final decision is pending at the time of
this writing.
114. Complaint I12, at 2-3, and Second Amended Complaint 111
5 & 6, at 1-2, Carolina. The action is a class action originally brought on behalf of "all persons who reside
or work in proximity to the William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, whose health and
safety and human environment will be threatened by this project." Complaint 1 5, at
4. Plaintiffs currently purport to represent all persons "who would be injured by an
accident caused by the breach of nuclear reactor containment or fuel transportation container, arising out of the operation of the McGuire or Catawba [Nuclear Station] plants."
Second Amended Complaint 6, at 2. All named individual plaintiffs and members of
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in their primary purpose, which was to block construction of the McGuire reactors; 115 as in Conservation Society, their challenge to the
constitutionality of section 2210(e) was a subsidiary issue upon which
they did not originally focus their full attention. 1 6 Nevertheless,
Carolinas attack on Price-Anderson is more expansive in its approach
than that in Conservation Society. The Act is assailed not merely on the
theory that it offends the due process clause of the fifth amendment

by taking property without just compensation,"17 but also on the grounds
that the liability limitation irrationally discriminates against nuclear
accident victims relative to other tort victims in violation of the fifth
amendment principle of equal protection"" and contravenes the ninth
and tenth amendments by denying such victims access to the courts
and to common law remedies. 1 9 More significantly for purposes of
this Comment, plaintiffs in Carolinahave distinguished themselves from
plaintiffs in ConservationSociety
their allegations of actual injury.' 0
They assert not only that section 2210(e) invades their interest in
halting the proliferation of nuclear power plants generally, as did plaintiffs in Conservation Society, but also that the liability limitation
harms their present interest in restraining construction of two particular facilities (McGuire and Catawba) and in maintaining the health
plaintiff organizations "live or own property from less than one-half to 25 miles" from
the plants. Id. 5, at 1-2. Plaintiff's interests in Carolinaare thus distinguishable at
the outset from those of plaintiffs in Conservation Society in that they are rooted in
property rights protected by the fifth amendment.
115. See Complaint
1, 6-24, 29, at 1, 4-16, 17-18, Carolina. Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975), upheld the AEC
order granting a construction license to defendant Duke Power Co. against plaintiffs'
charges that the
gave inadequate consideration to safety problems in drafting the
environmental impact statement which preceded issuance of the license.
116. See note 103 supra. It is uncertain whether the Carolina plaintiffs seek merely
to obtain a declaratory judgment under their Price-Anderson argument which would hold
the Act unconstitutional or whether they request also that construction of the McGuire
station be enjoined. If the latter, it is not clear why invalidating the statute should also
result in prohibiting activity for which the statute is not the sole legalizing authority.
117. Brief for Plaintiff at 17-21, Carolina (submitted July 16, 1975). Plaintiffs argue
that the statute differs from other laws limiting tort liability in that its liability cutoff
bears no rational relation to the damages likely to occur in a nuclear catastrophe and its
ceiling operates to externalize rather than internalize accident costs.
118. Id. at 22-23.
119. Id. at 23-25. Plaintiffs also contend that this violates the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. They particularly object to the bar on common law remedies for
injury caused by reckless or intentional conduct. See note 2 supra.
In addition, plaintiffs claim that the Act violates the constitutional mandate that
Congress "establish . . . uniform lavs on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added), on the ground that it
discriminatorily singles out nuclear reactor localities for special treatment. Brief for
Plaintiff at 25-26, Carolina(submitted July 16, 1975).
120. Id. at 13.
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and safety of their environment.' -' More specifically, they contend that
section 2210(e) is the critical factor in enabling power companies to
operate nuclear power plants and that the operation of the McGuire

and Catawba reactors will create continuing nuisances, injuring persons
and property by threatening them with disaster, by releasing radiation,
and by raising the temperature of lake waters that border their land. 2

Finally, they allege that, even though the plants are not yet operational,
the very existence of the liability ceiling has already harmed them by
reducing the value of their property, in part because the "significant
risk" of uncompensated injury caused by nuclear disaster has affected
the insurability of their land. 23
1.
(a)

Standing
General nonproliferation interest. The Carolina plaintiffs'

claim to justiciability under the nonproliferation theory can be dismissed under essentially the same analysis used in Conservation Society, r-4 but for slightly different reasons. 2 " Plaintiffs urge that they
can surmount the ripeness obstacle by introducing facts to show that

there is a "real threat" of injury to them and to their class in excess
of section 2210(e)'s maximum. 126 Regardless of the quality of evidence which plaintiffs may adduce, however, it is submitted that extant
121. Id. The Second Amended Complaint makes it clear that plaintiffs' Price-Anderson claims relate to both the McGuire and the Catawba reactors.
122. Second Amended Complaint 1 20-21, at 5, Carolina.
123. Id. l 22-23, at 5.
124. See Appendix and notes 103-11 supra and accompanying text. Although this
injury may satisfy the standing requirements of article III, plaintiffs appear to fail to
meet the prudential standing test of Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). As property
owners, they have a stronger claim to discretionary standing than did plaintiffs in Conservation Society in that they can demonstrate an injury to a particularized interest in
nonproliferation. They also might demonstrate the requisite connection between the fifth
amendment and that interest more readily than could non-property owners. The problem is that there is no case law or other authority to demonstrate that the fifth amendment may be "properly understood" to protect such an interest. See Warth, 422 U.S.
at 500-01. It is in cases like this that the Supreme Court's reduction in the scope of
discretionary standing will take its toll, for plaintiffs might well have been able to
satisfy the previously controlling "arguably within the zone of interests" test which the
Court modified in Warth. See note 33 supra.
The claim must therefore fail for lack of standing unless it is read, as Judge
Bazelon read the similar claim in Conservation Society, to be based on the property
interests of future possible accident victims rather than on the asserted nonproliferation
interest.
125. Compare the Government's contention that the result in Carolinashould follow
a fortiori from Conservation Society. Brief for Defendant NRC at 5-6, Carolina (submitted Nov. 3, 1975).
126. Brief for Plaintiff at 7-9, Carolina (submitted July 16, 1975).
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literature on commercial nuclear power dangers does not support a
conclusion that such an injury is sufficiently likely to these plaintiffs-

as distinguished from the class of all persons residing or working in
the vicinity of all nuclear plants-to meet applicable ripeness standards. 127 Indeed, plaintiffs implicitly admit the weakness of this position by their failure to assert imminent nuclear injury as a ground for
obtaining relief.
(b)

Non-construction of McGuire and Catawba. The basis of

the claim that Price-Anderson harms plaintiffs' interest in preventing
construction of the McGuire and Catawba facilities appears to be that

the liability ceiling encourages, if it does not enable, defendant Duke
Power Company to invest in these potentially hazardous installations.

But plaintiffs have not identified a source of legal protection which
recognizes their asserted interest.

Neither the Act, the Constitution,

nor the common law affords them the required recognition. 12 The
Administrative Procedure Act, 129 under which their injunctive action
was in part originally brought, arguably recognizes such injuriesbut only to the extent that they result from administrative action, and
not from the operation of a statute. 30
127. The highest probability found was on the order of 1/2500 for a given plant per
year with 100 plants on line. Although such estimates indicate that the risk is much
greater than the Government maintains, most estimates are much lower and in any
event none indicate substantial risk to the environs of any single plant taken alone.
See Appendix. Both defendants in Carolina have strongly emphasized this point,
pointing out that the imminence of such prospective injury is further reduced by the fact
that the McGuire facilities are not yet licensed to operate. See Brief for Defendant
Duke Power Co. at 9-10, 18-19, Carolina (submitted Sept. 2, 1975); Brief for Defendant
NRC at 2-3, Carolina (submitted Nov. 3, 1975). Plaintiffs could conceivably increase
the imminence of injury by broadening their class to encompass persons similarly situated
with respect to all planned and operating nuclear facilities.
128. Compare notes 33, 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
129. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
130. Id. § 702. That section provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." See Complaint at 3, Carolina.
Plaintiffs have already been accorded full judicial consideration of harms done to this
interest by the administrative action of the NRC. See Carolina Environmental Study
Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
In reality, plaintiffs' claim in that action was based on injury not to an interest
in blocking construction but to an interest in assuring the safety of the McGuire reactors. This gave them standing under the APA to assert their more remote interest. As
the defendants in the instant case suggest, plaintiffs' presently asserted interest in preventing construction of the reactors appears to be based on those same safety considerations which have already been fully adjudicated. See Brief for Defendant NRC at 4,
Carolina (submitted Nov. 3, 1975).
Plaintiffs did not argue the question of the constitutionality of Price-Anderson in
the prior suit. It would seem that a court's jurisdiction under the APA includes only
challenges to administrative action and not constitutional challenges to a statute itself.
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(c)

Environmental interest.

1001

Plaintiffs' argument that imminent

injury to their interest in preserving the health and safety of their
physical and human environment warrants the assumption of jurisdiction to consider their challenge to section 2210(e) is more substantial.

They have suggested three theories, all sounding in the common law tort
of nuisance, under which the liability limitation would injure this interest: they allege that the operation of the McGuire and Catawba

reactors-which would not occur in the absence of the Price-Anderson
Act-will damage their use and enjoyment of their land by raising the

water temperature of adjacent lakes, by continually releasing radiation, and by posing a constant threat of nuclear disaster.'31
Non-trivial injury of this nature, if caused by the operation of the

statute, would unquestionably satisfy the requirements of article M11.1 "2
Proof of liability for common law nuisance, of course, requires that
plaintiff demonstrate that his injury is substantial and that defendant's
conduct is unreasonable. 33 Those, however, are factual elements of
the tort to be proven on the merits and should not be necessary merely

to establish constitutional standing.'

4

Therefore, plaintiffs' allegation

that the Price-Anderson liability ceiling is a necessary precondition to

the operation of the challenged nuclear plants, to the detriment of their
health and safety interest, appears on its face to satisfy the "case or

controversy" clause.'3

5

Professor Davis has urged that once a litigant has established standing to challenge one
form of governmental action, he should ipso facto be found to have standing to challenge
on any ground other governmental action that affects him in the same way. See Davis,
supra note 28, at 631. In the present context, this reasoning would mean that plaintiffs
should have standing to attack Price-Anderson under the APA, since the liability limitation arguably shelters unsafe construction. See Appendix. The conclusion would then
follow that the constitutional challenge here would be as ripe for decision as was plaintiffs' statutory challenge in Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510
F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But the federal courts thus far do not appear to have
acted upon Professor Davis' suggestion.
131. Second Amended Complaint 11 20, 21, 24(A), at 5, Carolina. The apparent
point of their allegation is that higher water temperature will reduce the recreational
appeal of the lakes and that the cumulative effects of normal and abnormal releases of
radiation from the plants will impair their health and their enjoyment of their land. See
Statement of All Parties As To (1) Stipulated and Admitted Facts; and (2) Facts Remaining in Contention, at 22-23, Carolina (filed Aug. 5, 1976).
132. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 40-42
(1976); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153-54 (1970). See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text.
133. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 87, at 577-82 (4th ed.
1971).
134. Article III standing must be determined solely on the strength of plaintiff's allegations. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. The question of the substantiality
and reasonableness of the Price-Anderson Act's impact on plaintiffs' rights would more
appropriately be considered on a motion for summary judgment.
135. The Supreme Court's most recent case dealing with article III is also pertinent
here:
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Nor do these nuisance claims encounter difficulty with the discretionary requirements that the alleged injury be particularized as
opposed to one which all or a large class of persons suffer commonly,
that there be a direct connection between the injury and the challenged
action, and that the interest injured be legal, that is, properly understood
to be protected, explicitly or by clear implication, by the right, statute
or constitutional guarantee hi question. 136 Any injury to plaintiffs'
health and safety would meet the particularization test, since, as persons
maintaining a residence or having employment in the immediate vicinity
of the McGuire and Catawba nuclear stations, they have personal
and property, interests not shared by the public in general. The requisite directness emerges from the claim that Price-Anderson's liability
limitation is a sine qua non to the construction and operation of the
37
reactors. 1
Plaintiffs' claim to have protectible legal interests rooted in tort
law requires closer examination. It is clear that a threat of future
injury creates an actionable private nuisance at common law where it
interferes with the use or enjoyment of land.138 The damages plaintiffs
have alleged in the form of lake water temperature rise and cumulative
radiation leakage seem to be within the scope of prior nuisance cases,
particularly those involving water pollution, temperature change, offensive particles in the air, and health hazards.'3 9 The claim based on risk
[IThe "case or controversy" limitation of Art. III still requires that a federal
court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of
some third party not before the court. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
The Court also stated that article III requires "that the plaintiff who seeks to invoke
judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest" from the relief he demands.
Id. at 39. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
Plaintiffs contend that defendant Duke Power Co. would not commence the reactor
operations that will injure their interests in the absence of the liability cut-off and that the
requested relief-a declaration that section 2210(e) is unconstitutional-would cause
Duke not to commence operations. Second Amended Complaint
20, 21, 24(a), at 5,
Carolina. The validity of these allegations is uncertain but they are by no means
frivolous. See note 8 supra. These allegations, taken to be true as they must be for
purposes of determining standing, see note 21 supra and accompanying text, clearly
satisfy Eastern Kentucky's requirements.
136. See notes 32-33, 37, 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
137. Brief for Plaintiffs at 10, 12-13 (submitted July 16, 1975), and Second Amended
Complaint 120, at 5, Carolina. These are substantial allegations, for section 2210(e)
was intended to encourage construction of nuclear facilities and has succeeded in doing
so. See note 8 supra. Thus one test of directness is clearly satisfied. As to the other,
it would seem beyond dispute that the enactment of Price-Anderson constituted final
action. See note 32 supra.
138. See W. PROSSER, supranote 133, § 89, at 591-93.
139. See id. at 592 and cases cited therein.
The different ways and combinations of ways in which the interest in the
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of nuclear disaster is even more compatible with existing precedent.' 4
Fear-whether rational or irrational in its genesis-is a particularly
efficacious ground for a nuisance suit when it results from ultrahazardous activity engaged in by the defendant."4' The production of energy
through the use of nuclear-powered generators is clearly such an activity.' 42 And although Congress may for socially beneficial reasons
legitimize acts which endanger the safety of others, it may not abrogate
constitutional protections in doing so."' So long as plaintiffs can
satisfy the threshold requirement of demonstrating their prospective
ability to make a prima facie case of nuisance-showing that the inter44
ference with their interest is likely to be substantial and unreasonable1
-it would appear that neither prudential standing restraints nor the case
or controversy requirement will bar their action. 45
use or enjoyment of land may be invaded are infinitely variable. A private
nuisance may consist of an interference with the physical condition of the land
itself, as by. . . the pollution of a stream or of an underground water supply.
It may consist of a disturbance of the comfort or convenience of the occupant,
as by unpleasant odors, smoke or dust or gas, loud noises, excessive light or
high temperatures . . . or of his health, as by a pond full of malarial mosquitoes. Id. at 591-92 (footnotes omitted).
140. Likewise, it [the nuisance] may disturb merely his peace of mind, as in the
case of. . . an undertaking establishment, or the unfounded fear of contagion
from a tuberculosis hospital. A threat of future injury may be a present menace
and interference with enjoyment, as in the case of stored explosives [or] inflammable buildings or materials.

.

.

. Id. at 592-93 (footnotes omitted).

See also 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 326-29 (Rohan rev. ed. 1975).
141. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 140, at 328-30. "Fear, commonly induced, even
though demonstrably unjustified, can constitute the requisite harm." Id. at 328-29
(footnotes omitted); see W. PROSSER, supra note 133, § 89, at 591-92. Such fear may
be occasioned in Carolinaeither by the threat of nuclear damage resulting from the malfunctioning of the reactors or by the threat of uncompensated damages arising from a
nuclear holocaust. In neither case need plaintiffs' apprehension be reasonably related
to the demonstrable safety of the McGuire and Catawba plants or to the actual likelihood of escape of radioactive material from the reactors. Rather, such injuries stem
from the perceived risks of living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. The literature on the Price-Anderson liability ceiling and on the nuclear industry in general suggests that there is sufficient reason to fear that the dangers posed by commercial reactors exceed those claimed by adherents of nuclear power development. See Appendix.
142. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 133, § 78, at 516; Seavey, Torts and Atoms, 46
CAL. L. REV. 3, 6 (1958). For a recent discussion of the applicability of strict liability
principles to nuclear reactor incidents, see Note, Nuclear Torts: The Price-Anderson Act
and the Potential For Uncompensated Injury, 11 NEW ENGLAND L. Rnv. 111, 119-26
(1975).
143. W. PROSSER, supra note 133, § 79, at 524; ci. Linden, Strict Liability, Nuisance
and Legislative Authorization, 4 OSGoODE HALL L.J. 196, 208 (1966) ("a state may constitutionally legalize a public nuisance or foreclose its own right to sue, but it may not
legalize a private nuisance so as to interfere with private rights").
144. "So long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable, and such as would
be offensive or inconvenient to the normal person, virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance." W. PROSSER, supra note 133, § 89,
at 593 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 596-602.
145. One has standing to challenge governmental action under a common law injury
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Plaintiffs may, moreover, be able to circumvent this legal interest
analysis by treating their interests in preventing radiation leakage and
rise in water temperature as within the zone of interests protected by
the statute in question.

In enacting the Atomic Energy Act, 4 ' to

which the liability ceiling is an amendment, 147 Congress recognized
that nuclear production facilities are "affected with the public interest"

and indicated strong concern with protecting "the health and safety
of the public."148 That concern has traditionally been held to comprehend radiation damage to the public. 149 Subsequent legislation has
suggested that Congress' concern with the public health and safety extends to the health and safety of the environment, 150 and the legislative

history of the recent amendments to the Price-Anderson Act indicates
that the Congress believed that the Act was already susceptible to constitutional challenge on environmental grounds.' 5' Thus, it could be
theory if the injury caused by the government is such that it would be actionable if
caused by a private person. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424 (1969); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 493 n.22 (1959). Thus, plaintiffs will have standing to
challenge the Price-Anderson Act under any of their nuisance theories if they are able
to show that the operation of the plants will affect them in a "substantial" and "unreasonable" way as required by the common law of nuisance.
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1970).
147. Id. § 2210(e), as amended, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 6 (1975).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970); see id.§§ 2012(g), 2013(d), 2051(d), 2133(b),
2134(a), 2201(b). Indeed, one of the ostensible purposes of the liability ceiling itself
has been "to protect the public." See id. § 2012(i). See also note 7 supra.
149. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 171-75 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 962 (1969).
150. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (Supp. I,
1971); see Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1971):
The Atomic Energy Commission, for example, had continually asserted, prior
to NEPA, that it had no statutory authority to concern itself with the adverse
environmental effects of its actions. Now, however, its hands are no longer
tied. It is not only permitted, but compelled, to take environmental values into
account. Perhaps the greatest importance of NEPA is to require the Atomic
Energy Commission and other agencies to consider environmental issues just as
they consider other matters within their mandates (footnote omitted).
151. An amendment to the 1975 Price-Anderson renewal bill which sought to convey
explicit statutory standing to bring a declaratory judgment action upon anyone wishing
to challenge the constitutionality of section 2210(e) was defeated in the Senate by a vote
of 47 to 46. Senate Debate 22,366. Senator Hathaway, the proponent of the amendment, stated in debate that, if his amendment were not passed, plaintiffs in Carolina
would have standing and ripeness problems due to the lack of present nuclear injury.
Id. at 22,360. The measure was defeated, but only after Senator Baker, rising in
opposition to the amendment on the ground that it was unnecessary, asserted that under
the Declaratory Judgment Act "there are any number and range of circumstances in
which a party could have standing to sue . . .[and] which could permit him to make a
constitutional challenge . . .without the necessity of a nuclear accident beforehand."
Id. at 22,366. This assertion supports an inference that the Senators conceived that a
justiciable cause of action already implicitly existed in favor of a party who is a member
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concluded that the language of the Atomic Energy Act itself implies
a right of action in persons claiming that its liability limitation constitutes an impermissible threat to their health and physical well-being.' 2
The Carolina plaintiffs appear, therefore, to have demonstrable

claims to standing under common law and statutory guarantees which
protect them from the imminent nuisances they allege. The final inquiry is whether any of these claimed injuries presents a controversy
that is currently ripe for adjudication.
2. Ripeness. It is, of course, not absolutely certain that the
reactors will ever go into operation.

Construction must be completed;

safety reports must be analyzed and defended if challenged; an operating license must be granted and, if attacked, upheld on judicial review;
insurance and indemnity agreements must be made.' 5 3 But the Supreme
Court has recently ruled that a statute may be found ripe for judicial
review where there is a "distinct possibility" that it will operate in the

future to plaintiffs' detriment.15 4 This standard appears to be amply
satisfied on the instant facts.

The large investment in time and effort

by both defendants in planning, conducting and defending the construction of the reactors in question over the past several years attests to
their strong common commitment to make the reactors operational as
rapidly as possible. 155 The federal government has very rarely refused
to grant an operating license once construction of a reactor is complete. 156 While plaintiffs or other parties may stall operations at Mcof the class which section 2210(e) seeks to protect, even though no nuclear catastrophe
has occurred.
152. Plaintiffs thus would seem to have satisfied the prudential standing tests recently
enunciated in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975). See notes 40-45 supra
and accompanying text. The precise degree of clarity which Warth requires for implied
rights of action is an issue on which the Court has yet to shed light. See note 43 supra.
153. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1072-74 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (outlining procedure to obtain nuclear power plant operating license); Brief for
Defendant NRC at 2, Carolina (submitted Nov. 3, 1975). Defendants contend that no
injury could accrue to plaintiffs from the operation of the Price-Anderson Act until (1)
Duke Power Company obtains an operating license which, if challenged, is upheld on
review; (2) an indemnity agreement is executed for McGuire; (3) an accident at
McGuire causes damages exceeding $560 million; (4) plaintiffs or members of their
class suffer uncompensated injury; and (5) Congress fails to provide additional compensation sufficient to cover such damages. Brief for Defendant Duke Power Co., at 9-10,
Carolina (submitted Sept. 2, 1975); Brief for Defendant NRC at 2-3, Carolina (submitted Nov. 3, 1975).
154. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 123-25 (1974). See
notes 74-75, 80, 96 supra and accompanying text.
155. The instant litigation has been in progress since 1973. Construction of the
McGuire reactors was approximately half finished by the end of 1975. Operations are
expected to commence at Unit 1 in January 1978 and at Unit 2 in January 1979. Brief
for Defendant NRC at 2 n.1, Carolina(submitted Nov. 3, 1975).
156. "The NRC rarely denies a license when a utility has adequately prepared its
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Guire or Catawba for a time by challenging the final safety reports
or the grant of an operating license, it is virtually certain that the litigation will end and that at some point any safety problems in construction will be overcome. There can be no reasonable doubt that production of nuclear power, long encouraged by the shield of limited liability, will commence at McGuire and Catawba and that the insurance
umbrella of section 2210 (e) will go into effect.
Defendants have admitted that operation of the reactors will cause
radiation leakage and will raise the temperature of the lakes on which
they are situated.' 5 7 The present plaintiffs and their class-people who
live and work in the immediate vicinity-will bear the stress of the
constant risk of nuclear injury and uncompensated damage. "Where
the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals
is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy
that there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come
into effect."'" 8
Plaintiffs could, however, stay their action and seek similar relief after the plants have gone into operation. 15 9 The delay would
arguably facilitate documentation of the alleged injuries. In such
circumstances, even though the statute may be properly reviewable,
the separation of powers doctrine demands that there be affirmative
160
countervailing considerations militating in favor of immediate review.
Several such considerations appear in the present context. First, the
constitutional questions presented are basically legal in character and
require little factual elaboration.16' Second, the interests which plaintiffs seek to protect are not abstract but rather touch upon the very
plans." Rhodes, Delusions of Power, ATLANTIC, June 1976, at 35-36. Only once has a
reactor operating license been denied after construction was completed. F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 5.03, at 5-102 to 5-103 (1971).
157. Statement of All Parties as to (1) Stipulated and Admitted Facts; and (2) Facts
Remaining in Contention 23, Carolina(filed Aug. 5, 1976).
158. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974).
159. The expense of commencing and adjudicating a later lawsuit does not appear
to be a factor weighing in favor of immediate resolution where a convenient alternative
remedy will be available after the harn occurs. See note 65 supra. But, of course, the
existence of such a remedy cannot bar present review. Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 142 (1974).
160. See id.; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 71-72
(1961).
161. See note 103 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the due process
claim. The same logic applies to the equal protection and ninth and tenth amendment.
attacks: the amount of damage plaintiffs might suffer is irrelevant to the constitutionality
of their special tort classification or deprivation of their access to the courts to pursue
common law remedies.
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quality and conduct of their lives.'0 2 Third, immediate judgment on
the merits would, if contrary to the defendant's position, prevent serious
hfarm to plaintiffs and save defendant Duke Power Company from
further investment in an enterprise in which it might not be willing to
engage in the absence of section 2210(e)'s liability ceiling.
3.

The Fifth Amendment "Taking" Claim. Plaintiffs final

ground for justiciability obviates these ripeness considerations by alleging injury which has already occurred. They claim that they have
standing to sue under the fifth amendment 1 3 because their property
values have diminished in anticipation of the operation of the nuclear
stations. They assert that the Price-Anderson liability limitation, coupled
with the "significant risk" of an accident causing damages in excess of
that limit, has affected the insurance status and thereby reduced the

market value of their properties. 64

In addition, they claim that the

imminence of the various nuisances which will result from the opera-

tion of the reactors has lowered their property values. 6 5
ing is readily found where plaintiffs allege loss of property
though it may be held on the merits that there has been
within the fifth amendment, 66 it appears that plaintiffs
have alleged a sufficient constitutional injury in fact.'

67

Since standvalues, even
no "taking"
in Carolina

The Price-Anderson Act causes damage to them, plaintiffs assert,

because in its absence defendant Duke Power Company would either
not operate the reactors or would obtain insurance to compensate in162. See note 65 supra. The creation of an unsafe or unhealthy living environment
would disturb important interests in mental security in living and working-plaintiffs'
"primary conduct."
163. "No person shall be .. . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. 5.
164. Second Amended Complaint 23, at 5, Carolina;Statement of All Parties as to
(1) Stipulated and Admitted Facts; and (2) Facts Remaining in Contention 23, Carolina (filed Aug. 5, 1976).
165. Statement of All Parties as to (1) Stipulated and Admitted Facts; and (2) Facts
Remaining in Contention 23, Carolina (filed Aug. 5, 1976). Plaintiffs have claimed an
additional unspecified loss of value to their real estate resulting generally from the liability limitation. Second Amended Complaint l 21, 24(a), at 5, Carolina.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 162 (1958).
Whether plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate a taking on the merits is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
167. See notes 20, 27-31 supra and accompanying text. Plaintiffs' allegation of injury
does not seem frivolous. For example, state actions limiting home construction in the
vicinity of nuclear reactors because of possible radiation hazards caused a public scare
and resulted in a depressed real estate market in one New Jersey community. Moore,
It May Be a Hazard,But Lacey Township Loves Nuclear Plant, Wall Street J., Aug. 11,
1976, at 1, col. 1.
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jured parties fully in the event of an accident.:6 Thus, plaintiffs conclude, they would benefit directly from the requested relief-a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional-in that such relief would eithet
cause Duke not to begin operations or induce Duke or the Congress
to provide full compensation to them in the event of a disaster.' 69 On
their face, then, these allegations establish a case or controversy within
1 70
the meaning of constitutional standing doctrine.
The pleadings appear to satisfy the prudential standing requirements as well. It is clear that governmental action resulting in the depreciation in value of private property may amount to a taking within
the meaning of the fifth amendment.' 7M The alleged loss of value would
therefore impair a legal interest.' 7 2 The injury is sufficiently direct because plaintiffs' allegations causally connect the statute to their property losses. 173 Finally, the diminution is particularized because plaintiffs, as property owners, have7 interests unique to themselves and not
shared by the public generally.' '
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Comment began by positing a dilemma-that a statute intended to foster conditions which might lead to a catastrophe could be
subjected to constitutional review only after the catastrophe had occurred.
Closer scrutiny suggests that the dilemma is largely illusory. Plain168. Second Amended Complaint 1120, at 5, Carolina. This allegation effects compliance with the causation element of the constitutional standing requirement, see note 49
supra and accompanying text.
169. Second Amended Complaint 24, at 5-6, Carolina. This allegation meets the
case or controversy prerequisite that the requested relief promise palpably to benefit the
plaintiff, see note 50 supra and accompanying text.
170. See notes 27-52 supra and accompanying text.
171. E.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); cf. United States
v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958). See note 167 supra.
172. See notes 32, 44 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 32, 168 supra and accompanying text. It is worth noting, however,
that alleging a direct injury for purposes of standing is not the same as proving a direct
injury on the merits. The Supreme Court has held, on facts somewhat analogous to the
facts in Carolina, that governmental action was not the proximate cause of the diminished value of plaintiff's property rights when that action was specifically directed at a
third party and not at the plaintiff. In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 502 (1923), the Government had requisitioned the entire output of a steel manufacturer for war purposes and thereby rendered nugatory the plaintiff's valuable steel
supply contract with that manufacturer. In plaintiff's suit for compensation under the
fifth amendment, the Court assumed that there was standing to sue but held that plaintiff's injury was "consequential" to the Government's action and therefore that there had
been no "taking." The proximate cause issue in Carolina is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
174. See note 33 supra.
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tiffs in Conservation Society and, to some extent, those in Carolina,

have fallen into the conceptual error of relying upon abstract interests
which might support challenges to administrative action but which
cannot, in view of the Supreme Court's recent retreat from its prior
expansive approach to the prudential standing doctrine, serve as a
basis for attacks on the constitutionality of an act of Congress. Moreover, plaintiffs in each case have exacerbated their ripeness problems
by placing too much emphasis upon the wholly conjectural probability
of a nuclear holocaust of dimensions which would exceed the $560
million liability limitation set by section 2210(e). But the complainants in Carolina have also alleged several types of concrete injury to recognized interests-imminent injuries rooted in common law
nuisance theory and present injuries sounding in the more demanding
realm of fifth amendment takings-which plainly set forth justiciable
controversies and which therefore ought at least to secure for plaintiffs
a forum in which to question the reasonableness of the Price-Anderson
Act's liability ceiling.
There is an additional and particularly compelling reason to find
the constitutional questions occasioned by the existence of the PriceAnderson Act justiciable. Nuclear power is representative of a new
and qualitatively unique class of phenomena-radical technical innovations holding great promise but posing risks which may not be susceptible of reasonable assessment at the time of initial mass application.
As, for example, the national experience with pesticides in the postWorld War II era has shown, such traditional concepts as "injury,"
"imminence," and "causation" can take on entirely different meanings
in these contexts, and traditional forms of judicial review can be
rendered insignificant.' 7 5 Under such circumstances, ought the courts
to refuse in the name of purely prudential restraints to hear a complaint
that Congress has unconstitutionally burdened the public with an inestimable risk in order to develop a technology of unknown potential,
simply because that risk has not yet borne fruit?
175. Current experimentation in biomedical engineering may portend another addition to this class of phenomena. See Auerbach, Youth Questioning Genetic Engineering, The Sunday (Cleveland) Plain Dealer, Aug. 8, 1976, § 4, at 6, col. 1 (some scientists oppose large-scale research investment in genetic engineering because they analogize
the risks to those of nuclear energy); Gumpert, Gene Transplants Stir Communities'
Fears; Scientists Are Split, Wall Street J., Sept. 28, 1976, at 1, col. 1; Palfrey, Energy
and the Environment: The Special Case of Nuclear Power, 74 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1375,

1409 (1974).
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APPENDIX
Judge Bazelon's finding in Conservation Society on the unlikelihood
of a major reactor catastrophe side-stepped the hotly debated issue of nuclear
safety. A recent government study concluded that the risk of a maximal disaster at a modem reactor subject to the NRC's rigid safety and licensing
controls was, at most, one in a million per year. Rasmussen Report, cited
in H.R. REP. No. 648, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975); see Hohenemser,
The Failsafe Risk, ENVIRONMENT, Jan./Feb. 1975, at 6. Proponents of
commercial nuclear power development have continuously stressed that the
chance of disastrous nuclear occurrence at any particular reactor in any particular year is very low. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 648, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1975) ("extremely remote"); Huard, Reactors and Radioisotopes: The
Need to Revise National Policy, 11 STAN. L. REV. 7, 22 (1958).
Persons formerly associated with the AEC have asserted that even the
postulated chains of circumstances leading up to the accidents upon which
the study based its risk estimates were "macabre mathematical exercises,
almost totally divorced from reality." Doub, Nuclear Power: A Cool Approach, 10 TRIAL 18, 24 (1974); see Palfrey, Energy and the Environment:
The Special Case of NuclearPower, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1398 (1974).
Accepting this line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that the likelihood of an "extraordinary" incident precipitated by a
loss of coolant accident coupled with a failure of the backup emergency
core cooling system was "not more than one in ten million during a year's
operation." Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F.2d 998, 999 (2d Cir. 1974).
The same government study, while conceding that property damage
alone resulting from such an incident might reach into the tens of billion of
dollars, see Senate Debate 22,357, 22,373; House Debate 11,936, revised
downward prior predictions of personal injury damages. The Rasmussen
Report indicated that a major accident at a small (500 MW-small by current standards, since typical modern units generate 3300 MW thermal energy
and 1000 MW electrical energy-see Primack, supra note 8, at 15) reactor
would cause up to 92 deaths and 200 other injuries, totaling injury damages
of $1.7 billion. AEC, Summary Report, 16 AToMIc ENERGY L.J. 177, 202
(1974). This constituted a considerable reduction from 1957 government
estimates of 3,400 deaths and 43,000 injuries in a similar catastrophe, AEC,
THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN
LARGE NUCLEAR PLANTS (1957) (Brookhaven Report); AEC, Summary

Report, supra, at 202, and from the results of the "Brookhaven Update,"
a third AEC-sponsored study which updated the Brookhaven Report in 1965
but which was not made publicly available until 1973. Study Group on
Light-Water Reactor Safety, Report to the American Physical Society, 47
REV. OF MOD. PHYSICS, Supp. No. 1, at S103 (1975).
The Brookhaven
Update group found that "the theoretically calculated damages would not be
less and under some circumstances would be substantially more than the

Vol. 1976:967]

PRICE-ANDERSON ACT

1011

consequences reported in the earlier study." Hearings on Proposed Extension of AEC Indemnity Legislation Before the Subcommittee on Legislation
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 347-48
(1965) (letter of AEC Commissioner Seaborg).
This study has been the subject of intense scrutiny and criticism. Critics,
lacking the resources necessary to prepare an independent study, see, e.g.,
Boffey, Reactor Safety: Congress Hears Critics of Rasmussen Report, 192
SCIENCE 1312 (1976); Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, Report
to the American Physical Society, 47 REV. OF MOD. PHYsICS, Supp. No. 1,
at S5 (1975), have rejected the government's probability estimates because
of numerous asserted flaws in the scope and methodology of the government
study. They condemn the study for failure to weigh the relative safeties
of various reactor types, Hohenemser, supra, at 9-10; see Nuclear Safety:
Calculating the Odds of Disaster, 185 SCIENCE 838 (1974) for neglecting to
test quantitatively present fail-safe safety systems, Finlayson, A View From

the Outside, 31 BULL. OF-THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 20, 22-23 (Sept. 1975);
Hohenemser, supra, at 9, and for inadequate and misleading statistical analysis, Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, supra, at S5; Weatherwax,

Virtues and Limitations of Risk Analysis, 31

BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIEN-

29-32 (Sept. 1975). One critic, finding that the Rasmussen Report
used inappropriate statistical principles and misapplied the ones it used, concluded that a multi-billion-dollar accident is likely once each 25 years if
there are 100 reactors of present design in operation. Hohenemser, supra,
at 6-8. An analysis of the Brookhaven Update indicated that one might
expect one accident per year with 100 plants on line. Nuclear Safey: AEC
Report Makes the Best of It, 179 SCIENCE 360 (1973).
Critics also denigrate the Rasmussen Report for its failure to assess the
full spectrum of possible accident causes, including human error, see Weatherwax, supra, at 30-31; Nuclear Safety: Calculating the Odds of Disaster,
supra, at 838-39 (1974), sabotage, see Bethe, 'No Fundamental Change
In the Situation,' 31 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 40, 41 (Sept. 1975);
Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, supra, at S6-7 (1975), and
terrorism, see Hammond, Nuclear Proliferation(I): Warnings From the Arms
Control Community, 193 SCIENCE 126 (1976) (reprocessed plutonium
waste from nuclear power plants and fissionable uranium isotope can both
be readily used to make bombs); Hohenemser, supra, at 9-10; cf. House
Debate 11,947, 11,955 (nuclear power plants have been subject to terrorist
raids in Europe); Ford & Kendall, What Price Nuclear Power?, 10 TRIAL 11,
12 (Jan./Feb. 1974).
The government study has been subject to further attack for inadequate
consideration of the dangers from a nuclear holocaust or other disaster occurring at a place other than the reactor site, see Nuclear Safety: Calculating
the Odds of Disaster, supra, at 838-39-such as might arise during transportation accidents, see, e.g., House Debate 11,943; STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE,
ATOMS AND THE LAw (1959); Murphy, Harnessing the Atomic Juggernaut:
TISTS
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The Need for Multi-Lateral Input in Nuclear Energy Decision-Making, 14
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 411, 420-21 (1974), during a military attack, see,
e.g., id at 419-21, or as a result of theft, see, e.g., Ford & Kendall, supra, at
12; Pulling the Plug on A-Power, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 23-24, natural disaster, see, e.g., Murphy, supra, at 419; Nader, supra note 8, at 21, or
leakage or explosion at radioactive waste storage sites. See, e.g., Murphy,
supra, at 418-21 (24,000-year half-life of plutonium wastes); Roisman,
Suing for Safety, 10 TRIAL 13, 16 (Jan./Feb. 1974).
Beyond criticism directed specifically at the Rasmussen Report itself,
opponents of the development of commercial nuclear power have attacked
the very proliferation of reactors as creating dynamic hazards. Bethe, supra,
at 41; Green, The Insurance Umbrella, 10 TRIAL 29, 35 (Jan./Feb. 1974).
See also Note, supra note 7, at 383-84 (describes health hazards caused by
radiation loss from nuclear plants which presently cannot be eliminated).
Finally, it has been urged that the liability limitation of section 2210(e)
itself multiplies the dangers. See Green, supra note 6, at 503-04. Green
explains in part:
. . . Price-Anderson also drastically reduces the deterrent effect of
liability as it affects decisions regarding the siting of plants (particularly
as they relate to locating plants closer to population centers), costcutting measures, and investment in plants with progressively larger
power capacity (as capacity increases, more fission products are stored,
and the amount of damage that may result from an accident also increases).
The net effect of Price-Anderson is to encourage the industry to
make decisions on technological and economic bases without reckoning with the full social costs that may result in the event of an accident.
Id.
Green disclaimed the suggestion "that Price-Anderson provides industry
with a license for reckless business decisions in disregard of the public safety,"
id, at 504; his point is that the Act encourages business decisions that will
multiply the hazards of accidents at the expense of the victims. See also
Senate Debate 22,337 (quoting remark of former AEC Commissioner Kriegsman: "Do away with [the Price-Anderson liability ceiling] and you'd probably see nuclear valves coming off the assembly line in better shape"). But cf.
id. at 22,353 (remark of Sen. Gravel that the insurance umbrella "does not
add to safety").
The agency's forecasts of damage, like those of probability, have been
criticized as being unrealistically low. Opponents have charged that the
government relied on overly optimistic assumptions and failed to consider
many factors. E.g., Rhodes, supra note 156, at 35; Study Group on LightWater Reactor Safety, supra, at S6.
Types of compensable personal injury damages likely to result from a
release of radioactive materials into the ground and atmosphere include death,
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increased susceptibility to disease, shortened life span or premature aging,
sterility, genetic damage, fetal damage, leukemia, lung cancer, thyroid cancer,
cataract and epilation, and damage to bone marrow. See generally STASON,
ESTEP & PIERCE, supra, at 28-35; Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics:
The Need for a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259,
262-68 (1960). Some of these injuries would appear soon after an accident,
whereas others might remain latent for as long as three generations. Comment, Nuclear Liability in the United States and Europe, 13 STAN. L. REV.
865, 866 (1961).
The Rasmussen Report, however, like the AEC's prior studies, only
took into account immediate health effects, and its damage estimates have
been strongly criticized as unreasonably low on that count. Boffey, supra,
at 1313; Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, supra, at S6, S108.
The reduced damage estimates are said to be based upon overly optimistic
assumptions regarding evacuation from the danger zone in a catastrophe.
Boffey, supra, at 1313; Rhodes, supra note 156, at 35, 37, 39. The Rasmussen Report has also been attacked for considering an insufficient variety
of types of nuclear incidents that could result in enormous damages. For
example, it has been said that a single disaster occurring during transportation of plutonium waste materials could maim or kill as many as 100 million
persons. House Debate 11,943. Such statistics make the Rasmussen Report's predictions, which considered only incidents arising at the reactor site,
appear grossly inadequate. See also NOT MAN APART, Jan. 1975, at 11
(citing an EPA report concluding that Rasmussen Report underestimated
injury risks in general by a factor of ten due to misrepresentation of health
effects of radiation and overly optimistic assumptions of local resident evacuation, and a Sierra Club report indicating that Rasmussen Report underestimated death and injury by a factor of sixteen).
Nor have the reviewers been satisfied with the Rasmussen Report's
estimates df potential property damage. For instance, the study allegedly
neglected to consider the full dangers of ground water contamination, a form
of great potential damage to both health and property. Study Group on
Light-Water Reactor Safety, supra, at S109; cf. Murphy, supra, at 419.
Non-AEC-sponsored estimates of the aggrgegate damage that might
arise from a single nuclear catastrophe have ranged as high as $280 billion.
Senate Debate 22,373. Moreover, inflation will continue to swell the damage
figures which might be expected. See e.g., House Debate 11,934, 11,936,
11,955; Senate Debate 22,352, 22,357; Note, supra note 142, at 133. Construction of plants nearer to urban centers will have a similar escalating effect
on damages. House Debate 11,936.
It is everywhere admitted that the nuclear industry boasts an excellent,
if not unprecedented, safety record in preventing injury to persons and property off-site. See, e.g., Murphy, supra, at 421; Study Group on Light-Water
Reactor Safety, supra, at S5. But see Rhodes, supra note 156, at 39 (much
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of the touted 2000 "safe years" of atomic reactor operation is based on the
performance of small power reactors and on 1500 reactor years of naval
ship reactors one-twentieth the size of modem electric power units, utilizing
a different reactor core and built to demanding Navy specifications on a
non-competitive basis; the safety records of the Navy reactors have never been
made public). Yet its record has been far from flawless in preventing onsite accidents. The AEC reported 1400 "abnormal" occurrences in 1974,
four of which it considered serious. Small amounts of radioactive material
escaped reactor confinement in one incident in 1974 and in at least one in
1975. Twenty-four reactors were temporarily shut down in 1974 due to
cracks in the emergency core cooling system. Pulling the Plug on A-Power,
supra, at 23. The history of commercial nuclear power has been spotted
with safety valve malfunction incidents, one of which resulted in the death of
two workers. Nuclear Safety: AEC Report Makes the Best of It, supra, at
362. "The history of waste management is a catalogue of errors and radioactive leaks which hardly provides a convincing example that future waste
management facilities (which are still in the developmental stage) will be
adequate." Roisman, Suing for Safety, 10 TRIAL 13, 16 (Jan./Feb. 1974).
Incidents during the early years of nuclear energy development, some resulting
in injury and death, are described in STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE, supra, at 68799; S. REP. No. 650, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM. N. 3209, 3212-13; and S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., in 1957
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. N. 1803, 1804.
Accidents have also taken place which might have resulted in off-site
injury. Some 115,000 gallons of radioactive waste had leaked from a buried
holding tank at the AEC's main storage facility near Hanford, Washington,
in 1973, before the leak was discovered-six weeks after it began. Fortunately, the leak involved primarily low-and middle-level wastes and apparently
no contamination of ground water by high-level wastes occurred. The incident brought the total leakage of radioactive wastes at Hanford since 1958
to 530,000 gallons. New York Times, Aug. 5, 1973, at 36. A much more
serious incident took place at the three-reactor Brown's Ferry nuclear plant
near Athens, Alabama, on March 22, 1975, when an uncontrolled fire raged
for nearly seven hours in the safety system control room. The fire, which
was caused by a worker's negligence, short-circuited many of the plant's
safety systems; others proved to be inoperative due to manufacturing flaws.
The most important failure was in the emergency core cooling system, the
standard fail-safe safety feature that is to replace any loss of coolant in the
reactor core so as to prevent a disastrous melt-down in the reactor core.
At Brown's Ferry, apparently, two-thirds of the coolant in one of the reactors
was lost and not replaced until the fire was extinguished. See Senate Debate
22,348-52 and authorities quoted therein. An only slightly less, serious incident occurred at the Enrico Fermi experimental fast-breeder reactor near
Detroit, Michigan, in October, 1966, involving a partial core melt-down.
(The Enrico Fermi incident actually came closer than the Brown's Ferry
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incident to causing a disaster but is considered less serious because it involved an experimental rather than a standard reactor.) That reactor was
permanently shut down. See authorities quoted in id. at 22,351. A major
release of radioactivity into the atmosphere took place at the NRX Reactor in
1952, when a cloud containing dangerous quantities of radioactive material
forced the shutdown and evacuation of the reactor building and disappeared
into the unpopulated countryside. F. GRAD, supra note 156, § 5.01, at n.93.
The only other actual major leakage of radioactive materials into the atmosphere in the history of nuclear power technology occurred at a plutonium
reactor in England in October, 1957, contaminating property for some 200
square miles. The British government suppressed the cause and other details
of the incident. STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE, supra, at 695-96; Huard, supra
note 2, at 23. Critics have suggested that industry reluctance to invest in
nuclear reactor construction without the protections offered by section 2210
(e) demonstrates that the industry is itself less impressed by its safety record
than it hopes the public will be. See note 8 supra.
In light of the industry's safety record and the criticism of AEC/NRC
projections, the validity of the Court's finding in Conservation Society concerning the likelihood of an accident is at least open to question.

